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ABSTRACT
SECURITY ISSUES IN NETWORK VIRTUALIZATION
FOR THE FUTURE INTERNET
SEPTEMBER 2012
SRIRAM NATARAJAN
B.E., ANNA UNIVERSITY, CHENNAI, INDIA
M.S., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS, AMHERST
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Tilman Wolf
Network virtualization promises to play a dominant role in shaping the future In-
ternet by overcoming the Internet ossification problem. Since a single protocol stack
cannot accommodate the requirements of diverse application scenarios and network
paradigms, it is evident that multiple networks should co-exist on the same network
infrastructure. Network virtualization supports this feature by hosting multiple, di-
verse protocol suites on a shared network infrastructure. Each hosted virtual network
instance can dynamically instantiate custom set of protocols and functionalities on
the allocated resources (e.g., link bandwidth, CPU, memory) from the network sub-
strate. As this technology matures, it is important to consider the security issues and
develop efficient defense mechanisms against potential vulnerabilities in the network
architecture.
vi
The architectural separation of network entities (i.e., network infrastructures,
hosted virtual networks, and end-users) introduce set of attacks that are to some
extent different from what can be observed in the current Internet. Each entity is
driven by different objectives and hence it cannot be assumed that they always coop-
erate to ensure all aspects of the network operate correctly and securely. Instead, the
network entities may behave in a non-cooperative or malicious way to gain benefits.
This work proposes set of defense mechanisms that addresses the following challenges:
1) How can the network virtualization architecture ensure anonymity and user privacy
(i.e., confidential packet forwarding functionality) when virtual networks are hosted
on third-party network infrastructures?, and 2) With the introduction of flexibility
in customizing the virtual network and the need for intrinsic security guarantees, can
there be a virtual network instance that effectively prevents unauthorized network
access by curbing the attack traffic close to the source and ensure only authorized
traffic is transmitted?.
To address the above challenges, this dissertation proposes multiple defense mech-
anisms. In a typical virtualized network, the network infrastructure and the virtual
network are managed by different administrative entities that may not trust each
other, raising the concern that any honest-but-curious network infrastructure provider
may snoop on traffic sent by the hosted virtual networks. In such a scenario, the
virtual network might hesitate to disclose operational information (e.g., source and
destination addresses of network traffic, routing information, etc.) to the infrastruc-
ture provider. However, the network infrastructure does need sufficient information
to perform packet forwarding. We present Encrypted IP (EncrIP), a protocol for
encrypting IP addresses that hides information about the virtual network while still
allowing packet forwarding with longest-prefix matching techniques that are imple-
mented in commodity routers. Using probabilistic encryption, EncrIP can avoid that
an observer can identify what traffic belongs to the same source-destination pairs.
vii
Our evaluation results show that EncrIP requires only a few MB of memory on the
gateways where traffic enters and leaves the network infrastructure. In our proto-
type implementation of EncrIP on GENI, which uses standard IP header, the success
probability of a statistical inference attack to identify packets belonging to the same
session is less than 0.001%. Therefore, we believe EncrIP presents a practical solution
for protecting privacy in virtualized networks.
While virtualizing the infrastructure components introduces flexibility by repro-
gramming the protocol stack, it doesn’t directly solve the security issues that are
encountered in the current Internet. On the contrary, the architecture increases the
chances of additive vulnerabilities, thereby increasing the attack space to exploit and
launch several attacks. Therefore it is important to consider a virtual network instance
that ensures only authorized traffic is transmitted and attack traffic is squelched as
close to their source as possible. Network virtualization provides an opportunity
to host a network that can guarantee such high-levels of security features thereby
protecting both the end systems and the network infrastructure components (i.e.,
routers, switches, etc.). In this work, we introduce a virtual network instance using
capabilities-based network which present a fundamental shift in the security design
of network architectures. Instead of permitting the transmission of packets from any
source to any destination, routers deny forwarding by default. For a successful trans-
mission, packets need to positively identify themselves and their permissions to each
router in the forwarding path. The proposed capabilities-based system uses packet
credentials based on Bloom filters. This high-performance design of capabilities makes
it feasible that traffic is verified on every router in the network and most attack traffic
can be contained within a single hop. Our experimental evaluation confirm that less
than one percent of attack traffic passes the first hop and the performance overhead
can be as low as 6% for large file transfers.
viii
Next, to identify packet forwarding misbehaviors in network virtualization, a
controller-based misbehavior detection system is discussed as part of the future work.
Overall, this dissertation introduces novel security mechanisms that can be instanti-
ated as inherent security features in the network architecture for the future Internet.
The technical challenges in this dissertation involves solving problems from computer
networking, network security, principles of protocol design, probability and random
processes, and algorithms.
ix
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
The current Internet has been vastly successful in achieving global connectivity
between a large number of diverse networks, devices, and users. This success is due to
the openness of the architecture and the general philosophy of allowing any system to
communicate with any other system on the network. Such open standard has made
it possible for everyone to communicate, offer service, make profit thereby creating
an indispensable impact on our lives. As a result, the Internet architecture has seen
the introduction of diverse end-systems (e.g., mobiles, laptops, smartphones, sensors,
etc.) and related protocols to support user requirements. Also, with the introduction
of massive influx of applications (e.g., video, financial transaction, shopping, enter-
tainment, business) and communication mediums, it is estimated that the Internet
has around 2.26 billion users (growth rate of 528.1% in the 11-year period between
2000 and 2011) connected to various application services around the world.
As of March 2012, Facebook has more than 901 million registered users, where
more than 58% of the users log on to the service every day [50]. 72 hours of video
are uploaded every minute on Youtube, where 3 billion hours of video are viewed
each month. Last year, Youtube had a total of 1 trillion video views [132]. Recently,
the amount of time spent accessing the Internet on mobile applications (81 minutes
per day) have surpassed the total time spent (74 minutes per day) on desktops and
laptops. While such numbers are heartening to see the wide variety of functionalities
the Internet has provided, a major shortcoming with the architecture is the difficulty
in providing inherent security guarantees.
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1.1 Security in Current Internet Architecture
Reports from the US federal agency show a 650% increase in security violations in
the last five years from 5503 cases in 2006 to 41776 in 2010 [79]. Network attacks have
continued to compromise various business and government organizations ranging from
attacking the Japan’s Space Agency network [99] to Sony’s playstation attack [98].
An illegal intrusion by computer hackers have compromised 20 years of student health
information (1982 to 2002) from the University of Massachusetts Amherst’s Health
Service [112]. Statistics reveal that personal and medical data of around 8 million
people were compromised during the last two years [114]. This continuous trend of
network security breaches have not just affected personal computers and servers but
have targeted smartphones and physical systems as well. Computer attackers eaves-
dropped on police radio communications using smartphone applications [100], while
hackers were able to shutdown the Curran-Gardner public water facility in Spring-
field, Illinois, USA [101]. Experts believe a co-ordinated distributed denial-of-service
(DDoS) attack was launched to bring down popular websites such as “Wikileaks” and
“The Pirate Bay” which led to the disruption of their services for three days [133].
In addition to various security issues in the current Internet architecture, user pri-
vacy, identity theft, censorship of data, biased monitoring and traffic discrimination
are prevalent [89]. While cryptographic protocols can protect the data content, the
traffic can still reveal the communicating entities to ISPs in the network path [68].
Reports suggest that ISP’s log user browsing data and sell sensitive information to
advertisement companies [92], inject RESET packets to bring down P2P connec-
tions such as BitTorrent and Gnutella [46] thereby disrupting user activities. Such
biased control by ISP’s clearly compromises user privacy. While proxy servers and
anonymous overlay networks [40] bring in some respite to the privacy issue, several
attacks [1], [49] have shown to compromise such systems.
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Figure 1.1. Security in Current Internet Architecture.
To address some of the above attacks and vulnerabilities various security features
are supported as point solutions in the Internet architecture. Figure 1.1 shows the set
of security extensions added to the Internet protocol stack. To provide authentication,
confidentiality, integrity, and availability, a number of additions have been developed.
These approaches range from cryptographic operations on end-systems and routers
(e.g., SSL, VPN) to dedicated traffic monitoring and access control (e.g., firewalls, in-
trusion detection systems, intrusion prevention systems) to defenses against denial of
service (DoS) attacks (e.g., anomaly detection, rate limiting). While such extensions
provide point solutions in the defense against specific attacks, it has been difficult
to envision how novel security mechanisms can be deployed at an architectural level.
Also, there are needs for more security support for new communication paradigms
and domain-specific networks such as financial transactions, military communication,
and remote medical procedures. For many of these new communication domains,
specialized protocol suites have been developed. Due to this specialization, it is not
expected that a single protocol stack can satisfy all the needs of a future Internet.
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Therefore, to provide inherent security guarantees it is necessary to design an entirely
new network architecture that can overcome the shortcomings of the current Internet.
1.2 Network Virtualization Architecture
Next-Generation Internet architectures are currently being explored in the net-
working research community [52]. Network virtualization is a key technology that is
necessary to support diverse protocol suites in the future Internet [52], [8], [51], [36],
[111]. The idea of virtualizing the network components has gained significant atten-
tion in the context of networking testbeds. This facilitates researchers to evaluate new
ideas and test experiments/protocols in realistic scenarios GENI [77], Planetlab [88],
Emulab [113], VINI [17]. As a result, virtualization in a shared testbed proved to
be successful in overcoming the limitations and complexities of individual physical
testbed. To extend the success of virtualized testbeds to realistic network scenar-
ios, [51] proposes a network architecture that separates the role of Internet Service
Providers (ISPs) into Infrastructure Providers (managing physical infrastructure) and
Service Providers (running customizable network protocols and services).
Network virtualization introduces flexibility to the Internet ossification by sepa-
rating the functionalities into the following entities:
• Network Infrastructure (NI): provides the physical components required to setup
the network (e.g., routers and links). NI efficiently allocates the required net-
work bandwidth and physical resources (device CPU and memory) for each vir-
tual network, ensuring proper resource isolation between them. Related work
has explored algorithms for mapping (i.e., resource allocation) [37] and router
designs to support virtualization [8, 126].
• Virtual Networks (VN): deploy customizable network protocols by leasing the
required infrastructure resources from multiple NIs. Each virtual network is a
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Figure 1.2. Virtualized Network Infrastructure.
combination of multiple virtual routers and links. When initiating a service, the
VN confines to Service Level Agreements (SLA) with set of NIs and receives
the requested resources. Each VN then instantiates the service (e.g., novel
network protocol) on the allocated resources to form a virtual network topology
by connecting end-users to the network.
• End-Users: are similar to the current Internet architecture but have the oppor-
tunity to choose from multiple virtual network services.
For any virtual network, the above architectural separation reduces the cost in-
volved in setting up the physical resources and reduce maintenance costs.. Each vir-
tual network can provide its users with a custom set of protocols and functionalities
(e.g., security features). Figure 1.2 shows two virtual networks sharing the network
infrastructure resources. Both VNs deploy their customized network services on the
shared infrastructure components and establish end-to-end connectivity between end-
users. Once deployed, each VN can then operate the control plane functionalities on
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the NI resources and direct the NI to perform the required data plane features (e.g.,
packet forwarding).
Despite the various advantages, hosting multiple virtual networks on a shared
network infrastructure introduces new security challenges unlike seen in the current
Internet. The VN cannot assume inherent provision of security features by the hosting
NI and is oblivious to the malicious activities of the infrastructure. In addition, with
the infrastructure resources being shared among multiple virtual networks it presents
an opportunity for attackers to co-host malicious network services and attack the
legitimate VNs. For the NI, the hosted virtual networks should not launch attacks
or access privileged information on the infrastructure. Therefore, to understand the
possible security issues in detail this dissertation focuses on identifying the attacks and
vulnerabilities that are unique to the virtualized network infrastructure environment.
For a successful adaptation of the technology for the future Internet, it is important
to address the security issues with effective defense mechanisms.
1.3 Security in Network Virtualization
Some of the security challenges that the proposed network virtualization architec-
ture should address are listed below:
• Privacy and Confidentiality: The network infrastructure can introduce bi-
ased management practices, snoop confidential information, or launch hidden
attacks on the hosted virtual networks. Hence, a secure packet processing
methodology (e.g., confidential packet forwarding) should be provided by the
NI component with certain level of data transparency (a mechanism to process
the packets without exposing the input data) between the hosted VNs and the
NIs.
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• Trust: To setup end-to-end network connectivity, the virtual network service
should partner with multiple infrastructure providers with varying levels of
agreements and requirements. This requires that the virtual network should
trust multiple competing network infrastructures to establish global connec-
tivity. Therefore the architecture should introduce a trustworthy interface or
management framework among the network entities.
• Authorization & Availability: The architectural separation of virtual net-
works and network infrastructures provide additive opportunity for attackers
to exploit vulnerabilities in both the network services and network components
to launch attacks. This can reduce the availability of network resources. Also,
with the infrastructure resources being shared among multiple virtual networks
it presents an opportunity for attackers to co-host malicious services and attack
the legitimate VNs. Therefore, the architecture should ensure only authorized
traffic is transmitted and attack traffic is curbed as close to the source as pos-
sible.
• Accountability: The problem of accountability is to identify if the underlying
virtual network service and the infrastructure components are providing the
guaranteed/promised level of services. The network entities are subjected to
both external and internal attacks and hence it is in the interest of all par-
ticipating entities to consider the problem of accountability (e.g., violations,
anomalies, tampering of resources, deviations from the expected behavior, etc.)
in the virtual network provisions.
• Isolation: Since multiple virtual networks are co-hosted on a shared infras-
tructure resource, the architecture should consider effective isolation (e.g., IP
address space virtualization, layer-2 addressing, protect network configuration
information) between the virtual network resources. Also, for the network in-
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frastructure, the hosted virtual networks should not launch attacks or access
privileged information on the infrastructure.
1.4 Challenges and Requirements
This dissertation explores some of the fundamental security issues in the network
virtualization architecture by considering a thorough understanding of the attacks
and vulnerabilities and develop a secure network virtualization platform for the future
Internet. The following technical challenges and open questions are addressed in this
dissertation:
• Network Infrastructure:
– Can the network infrastructure perform packet processing functionality
without gaining any information on the operation of virtual networks?
– How can the network infrastructure ensure that the hosted virtual networks
does not introduce any malicious activities on the physical resources?
• Virtual Network:
– Can the virtual network trust the underlying network infrastructure?
– Can we have a virtual network instance that guarantees effective security
provision for end-users and prevent unauthorized network access to isolate
attack traffic?
– What security features are required for the virtual networks to host their
services (e.g., network protocols) on third-party network infrastructures?
• User:
– What level of security can the user expect from the network virtualization
architecture? How different is this from the current Internet?
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– Can the user customize/choose the required security functionality for each
network connection?
– How can the user identify if the guaranteed level of security is provided by
the network services and the infrastructure components?
– How can the user hold the network entities accountable for any security
violation?
1.5 Contributions
This dissertation introduces the following security features in the network virtu-
alization architecture:
1. Design a Confidential Packet Forwarding Technique: Any honest-but-
curious NI component can snoop on traffic sent by the virtual networks. Such
activities can identify the communicating entities (source and destination ad-
dresses) in each packet, what routes are used inside a virtual network, etc.
Revealing such information is undesirable since it compromises the privacy and
confidentiality of both users and virtual networks. Therefore, we require a tech-
nique that avoids such inferences about traffic while allowing the NI components
to perform the data plane functionalities. This introduces the need to forward
packets based on the encrypted forwarding address information. The specific
contributions of this work are:
• Identification of the anonymity and user-privacy issue in the context of
network virtualization architecture. Virtual networks are hosted on third-
party infrastructures and it is in the interest of both users and virtual net-
work providers to protect the operational information (e.g., traffic charac-
teristics, routing information) of the network from snooping infrastructure
providers.
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• An efficient design of the proposed EncrIP technique to solve the above
problem. To provide a practical, confidential packet forwarding function-
ality, EncrIP uses a combination of prefix-preserving and probabilistic en-
cryption technique. This ensures the effectiveness of the system against
statistical inference attack as well as allows the use of conventional for-
warding lookup technique.
• A quantitative security analysis of the proposed system with specific de-
tails on attack probability, space overhead, and security-space tradeoff in-
troduced in the system
• Prototype implementation and experimental evaluation of the proposed
technique. The EncrIP technique was implemented in ProtoGENI experi-
mental testbed to measure the probability of successful attack and measure
the performance overhead (i.e., speed of the cryptographic computations
per packet, memory cost on edge routers, prefix overhead on core routers)
introduced by the technique.
2. Design a Capabilities-Based Virtual Network Instance: A secure virtual
network instance that introduces a high-performance capabilities-based network
to reduce attack traffic (e.g., to prevent unauthorized network access, attack
traffic injection, and isolation of attack traffic) and allow only authorized net-
work access. The proposed network architecture requires every router in the
network to validate packets to ensure 1-hop containment of malicious traffic
and thus avoid the consumption of network resources as this traffic is forwarded
to its target. The specific contributions of this work are:
• A design of a deny-by-default architecture that uses data path credentials
to verify packet permissions on every hop.
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• An efficient design of data path credentials based on Bloom filters that
can be used for high-performance networks. These credentials are of con-
stant size (independent of the path length) and difficult to generate (and
thus difficult to fake), but computationally simple to verify for high-speed
forwarding.
• A quantitative study of security guarantees that can be provided by such
an architecture. A detailed security analysis of how well data path creden-
tials can defend against attacks in unicast, multicast, and network coding
settings is also provided.
• Results from a prototype implementation of the proposed protocol on Em-
ulab that demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed approach in de-
fending against denial-of-service attacks and that show limited overhead
and performance degradation from using credentials. The protocol header
was implemented between the network layer (i.e., IP) and transport layer.
Experimental nodes running Linux Kernel (2.6.21.4) were modified to sup-
port the processing of the proposed data path credentials header.
1.6 Organization
The rest of the dissertation is organized as follows: To understand the possible
security issues in detail, a detailed description of the security requirements, challenges,
attacker capabilities, and possible attack scenarios (attacks and vulnerabilities that
are unique to the virtualized networks) in each entity (i.e., network infrastructures,
virtual networks, and end-users) in the architecture is discussed in Chapter 2.
Chapter 3 presents a confidential packet forwarding technique that encrypts for-
warding address information of the communicating entities and provide a mechanism
for infrastructure components to forward packets based on the encrypted address.
The proposed encryption function introduces a combination of prefix-preserving and
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probabilistic encryption technique that ensures the anonymity and data confidential-
ity of end-users connected to virtual networks (e.g., forwarding addresses, network
topology, routing information) from the network infrastructure components. Also, a
detailed security analysis and experimental evaluation of the proposed technique is
discussed in this chapter.
Chapter 4 presents a capabilities-based virtual network instance that introduces a
robust, security-enhanced network architecture. The proposed architecture introduces
“data path credentials” which focuses on authorization and availability of legitimate
network traffic, by ensuring that only packets that have been positively identified are
forwarded in the network. This chapter elaborates the level of security achieved by
the capabilities-based network protocol by providing detailed security analysis and
experimental evaluation of the proposed architecture.
Chapter 5 summarizes the contribution of this dissertation and discusses the future
work. Related work for each of the proposed system is discussed in each chapter.
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CHAPTER 2
SECURITY ISSUES IN NETWORK VIRTUALIZATION
In this chapter, we discuss possible security issues in each entity in the architecture
by discussing the security model and possible attack scenarios that exhibit some
of the security concerns in network virtualization. Figure 2.1 shows the possible
combinations in which attacks can compromise different entities in the architecture.
For example, (2) indicates an attacker launching attacks (e.g., denial-of-service attack)
on the network infrastructure, (3) indicates a scenario when a malicious VN service
launches attacks on the end-users, while (7) indicates a network infrastructure entity
snooping the virtual network traffic. In the following subsections, we elaborate each
combination of attacks shown in Figure 2.1 with possible attack scenarios.
2.1 Users
Various network security issues and related defense mechanisms have been pro-
posed to protect end-systems. However we focus on attacks originating from a mali-
cious virtual network or from a vulnerable network infrastructure that compromises
the user.
2.1.1 Security Requirements
The basic security requirement for end-users is to ensure that attacks should not
modify the working of the end-system while being able to identify and discard attack
traffic.
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2.1.2 Attacker Capabilities
The following attacker capabilities define the possible attack scenarios that can
be launched on the end-users:
• An attacker can send attack packets to compromise or modify a specific func-
tionality on the end system.
• An attacker can sniff confidential information by introducing statistical infer-
ences on user traffic.
• An attacker can launch a flooding attack to send continuous network traffic and
throttle the network bandwidth of the end-user disrupting access to legitimate
network service.
• An attacker cannot physically access the end-system but can initiate remote
based attacks.
2.1.3 Attack Scenarios
Here we discuss potential vulnerabilities and attacks that can be launched on the
end-users by the networking entities.
NI attacks on User: A compromised network infrastructure can selectively
drop/modify packets belonging to particular sender or group of senders [12,39]. The
attacker could choose to drop a packet within a particular time window, thereby forc-
ing the sender to reduce their sending rate as they perceive congestion. The attacker
could selectively drop queued packets exploiting congestion control protocol at the
senders. The VN and the sender are completely unaware of the malicious activity of
the NI and hence are subjected to reduced quality of service provision. In chapter
3, we discuss one possible solution to address the data privacy and confidentiality
issue (to address unauthorized snooping of traffic) when hosting virtual networks on
third-party network infrastructures.
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Figure 2.1. Potential Attacks within Virtualized Network.
VN attacks on User: To control network congestion and maintain the promised
network access, the VN could introduce protocol specific interference by injecting
forged packets to disrupt the legitimate connection. Recent activities by Comcast to
inject TCP RESET packets on file sharing protocol connections disrupted user activ-
ities bringing down P2P connections such as BitTorrent and Gnutella [46]. Rather
than introducing dynamic traffic shaping mechanisms, the company blocked traffic
corresponding to P2P protocols by sniffing protocol headers and injecting forged pack-
ets to reset the connection, leading to the Net Neutrality debate [54]. Such practices
exhibit the level of control the virtual network has on the user traffic, introducing
various security issues.
2.2 Virtual Networks
Virtual Networks (VN) can be targeted by attacks generated from the underlying
infrastructure (NI), the co-hosted VNs or the users connected to the VN. In this
section, we discuss the security model for the hosted VNs explaining the security
requirements, attacker capabilities, and attack scenarios.
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2.2.1 Security Requirements
To ensure correct protocol processing of the hosted VNs we assume the following
security requirements:
• NIs should not snoop or monitor traffic associated to the hosted VN.
• NIs should not modify legitimate traffic or inject malicious traffic that disrupts
the working or functionality of the hosted VN.
• A co-hosted VN should not launch side-channel, timing attacks on a vulnerable
VN.
• Users should not be able to intrude and modify the functionality of the VN by
taking advantage of programmability.
• An inherent access control mechanism should ensure the security of privileged
information stored in VN.
2.2.2 Attacker Capabilities
The attacker capabilities that can compromise the hosted VN are:
• An attacker can instantiate a malicious protocol function to modify the normal
functionality of the virtual network.
• An attacker can sniff the state of the shared physical resources (e.g., memory
cache, CPU) on the network infrastructure to attack the co-hosted VNs.
• An attacker can intentionally modify or selectively manipulate the data traffic
associated with a particular VN.
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2.2.3 Attack Scenarios
Here we discuss potential vulnerabilities and attacks that can be launched on the
VN by illustrating each case with an attack scenario.
NI attacks on VN: Network infrastructures and virtual networks operate under
certain service level agreement (SLA). However, a compromised NI can modify the
hosted VN information (e.g., network protocols), violate the promised level of services
or compromise the operation of the hosted virtual network. This increases the trust
and accountability issues when hosting VN on third-party infrastructures, as discussed
in [61]. NI can also indulge in biased management practices (unauthorized snooping
of traffic) by introducing hidden VN monitoring activities on the network traffic, thus
violating user privacy and confidentiality. A solution to this problem is discussed in
Chapter 3.
VN attacks on co-hosted VN:
• Network virtualization projects such as [17], [51] propose that the logical isola-
tion between the hosted virtual networks significantly improves the secureness
of the system by providing better control and manageability. On the contrary
the isolation of resources can lead to entirely new set of network attacks. An
attacker could take advantage of the shared infrastructure platform by leasing
portion of resources to assess the vulnerabilities and functionalities of the co-
hosted VNs. The vulnerable VN could be another competing virtual network
provider running a specific service. Once the attacking VN is instantiated, it
takes advantage of the placement and launches a cross-VN side channel attack
to steal information from the vulnerable VN. An example of such an attack was
exhibited in the Amazon EC2 cloud service by [95] by launching cross virtual
machine side channel attacks. In our work, we perceive similar attacks can be
launched on the co-hosted virtual networks that share the same platform.
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• Another example for co-hosted virtual networks causing network configuration
integrity problem is discussed in the following example. To accommodate fine-
grained control, modern switching substrates (e.g., OpenFlow [70]) maintain
forwarding information for each active flow in a flow table. A separate control
plane manages flows within a subnetwork by updating this flow information
within switches. When using network virtualization, a technique that allows
sharing of networking resources among different logical networks, the physical
switch and its flow table need to be shared [102]. To maintain configuration
integrity, it is essential to implement an effective isolation mechanism for the
flow table between virtual network slices [74].
Current OpenFlow-based switches do not provide flow table isolation in hard-
ware and thus lead to hidden conflicts and misconfiguration of flows. Instead,
OpenFlow handles the flow conflict problem by assigning a priority to each
flow table entry. When using multiple controllers, effective isolation cannot be
achieved with priorities since individual controllers may make modifications to
the flow table that lead to hidden flow conflicts (e.g., a flow entry with higher
priority shadows another flow entry, flow conflicts [74], [5] or modifying the flow
entry that compromises some security-based flow rules [87]). As a result, Open-
Flow networks may exhibit network-level routing that is inconsistent with the
view of each VN thereby introducing security violations. One practical solution
to this problem is discussed in [74].
User attacks on VN: To reduce the complexity of network management of vir-
tual networks, [118] suggests an interesting solution to provide a live router migration
technique, transferring the control plane information (network protocol binaries and
configuration files) and re-instantiating the data plane state in the new physical router
platform. This approach is similar to the live virtual machine migration technique
introduced in [38]. During migration of the virtual network state, an attacker sniffing
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the network traffic can launch a Man-in-the-Middle (migration) attack to eavesdrop
the contents of the VN and other confidential information. An example of such an
attack in the context of live virtual machine image migration was shown in [80].
2.3 Network Infrastructure
The network infrastructure is vulnerable to attacks originating from the hosted
virtual networks or users associated with them. In this section we define our security
model explaining the security requirements, attacker capabilities, and attack scenarios
with respect to the network infrastructure.
2.3.1 Security Requirements
For a correct functioning of the network infrastructure we assume the following
security requirements:
• The hosted VN should not tamper with the allocated NI resources to gain
control of the infrastructure.
• NI should ensure complete isolation of physical and network resources between
co-hosted virtual networks.
• Legitimate traffic should be processed without any interference, while malicious
network traffic should be inferred and discarded.
• NI should support effective access control mechanism to protect from extraction
of secret information stored in the infrastructure.
2.3.2 Attacker Capabilities
The following attacker capabilities define the possible attack scenarios that can
be launched on the network infrastructure:
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• An attacker can send arbitrary data and control packets to flood the network
and bring down the NI.
• An attacker can asses the vulnerabilities of the infrastructure from the allocated
resources to intrude and take control of the entire infrastructure.
• An attacker cannot physically access the equipments but can initiate remote
based attacks.
2.3.3 Attack Scenarios
The following attack scenarios exhibit possible vulnerabilities in the network in-
frastructures:
User attacks on NI: Virtual network providers require flexibility in customizing
their service. Modern routers use general-purpose programmable packet processors
to reprogram the router functionality [44]. This feature however introduces new vul-
nerabilities thereby compromising the network infrastructure. With the introduction
of programmability in packet processors, code exploits such as buffer overflows, in-
teger vulnerabilities can introduce security issues. An attacker could inject a data
packet that takes advantage of the code vulnerability of the hosted virtual network
and modify the operation of the packet processor leading to a denial-of-service at-
tack [32]. This scenario is specific to the customization functionality introduced by
VN that can compromise NI components. Hence a secure programming paradigm is
required when instantiating the virtual network service by the network infrastructure.
A solution to curb attack traffic originating from unauthorized users is discussed in
Chapter 4.
VN attacks on NI:Amalicious VN can be motivated to attack the infrastructure
to disrupt the services hosted by a competing VN. The hosted platform gives extra
opportunity to asses the vulnerabilities of the infrastructure, identify router bugs [62]
to launch a flooding attack on the network and physical resources of NI. This can
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bring down the entire network infrastructure, eventually breaking the co-hosted VN.
Another scenario is when the attacker wishes to reproduce some features associated
to a co-hosted VN service, can manipulate the configurations of NI by extracting
secret information and eavesdrop on the hosted VN traffic. An example could be a
live video streaming service that can be eavesdropped, reproduced and redirected to
a set of unauthorized users.
2.4 Related Work
Network virtualization addresses the Internet ossification issue by providing a
shared, customizable platform to host diverse protocol suites, as shown in [8, 51, 52].
Several widely used Internet testbeds (e.g., GENI [77], Emulab [113], Planetlab [88])
use virtualization to separate different experiments and thus demonstrate that such
technology is feasible and practical. However, unlike the current Internet architecture,
the technology introduces new class of security issues [75]. Modern router designs
that support network virtualization require an embedded packet processing platform
that can perform custom packet processing for virtual networks that are deployed at
runtime [110], [131]. Packet processors in these systems are often implemented using
embedded multi-core network processors [120].
The problem of hosting network protocols and services on third-party infrastruc-
tures raises serious questions on the trustworthiness of the participating entities. Ref-
erence [115] shows the list of ISPs that introduce hidden traffic shaping techniques on
peer-to-peer protocols. Such activities indicate the requirement to examine security
issues, when hosting virtual networks on the network infrastructures. Information
leakage in virtualized network infrastructures are analogous to the cloud computing
paradigm. A side channel attack that extracts secret information by targeting co-
hosted virtual machines in Amazon EC2 service was shown in [95]. Reference [35]
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suggests a denial-of-service attack can be launched on the physical network which can
bring down all hosted virtual networks.
To address accountability in hosting virtual networks, violation detection using
processor extensions and network measurements to monitor service-level agreements
are introduced in [61]. Minimum disclosure routing [55] addresses the lack of op-
erational confidentiality when hosting virtual networks on third-party network in-
frastructure. The technique extends Secure Multiparty Computation [29] to allow
NI providers to compute the routing decisions using only local routing information.
To identify trustworthy infrastructure providers based on their past experiences and
feedback, [71] proposes a trust management framework between network entities. A
secure packet processing system that monitors the instruction level operations of the
packet processor (to detect malicious attacks) in the NI component was proposed
in [124]. Allowing virtual networks to customize the allocated resources by introduc-
ing programmability can lead to the introduction of malicious code on the router [33].
Solutions to this problem have been proposed using techniques from embedded system
security [32].
2.5 Summary
In this chapter, we discuss some of the security issues that can arise in the net-
work virtualization architecture. To address some of the above challenges, we discuss
possible defense mechanisms that guarantee the following security principles: Confi-
dentiality and Privacy, Authorization and Availability, and Accountability of virtual
network services. In the subsequent chapters, we discuss two security mechanisms
that are required to be included in the network virtualization architecture to ensure
that security is not an after thought process, but an integral part of the network
virtualization architecture.
22
CHAPTER 3
CONFIDENTIAL PACKET FORWARDING
In this chapter, a confidential packet forwarding functionality is proposed that
protects user privacy when network traffic is forwarded by third-party network in-
frastructures. In a typical virtualized network, the infrastructure and the virtual
network instance may be managed by different administrative entities that may not
trust each other. In such a scenario, the virtual network operator might hesitate to
disclose network configuration or control information (e.g., source and destination
addresses of network traffic, routing information, etc.) to the infrastructure provider.
However, the network infrastructure provider does need sufficient information to im-
plement the packet forwarding functionality within the virtual network. Therefore, it
is important to develop mechanisms that protect a virtualized network’s operational
information, while allowing an efficient implementation on the network infrastructure.
Some initial ideas on this topic have been published in prior work, which includes an
introduction to the proposed encryption technique [75], [76].
The ability to share physical resources among multiple virtual networks presents
advantages, including lower operational costs by avoiding the need to maintain sep-
arate physical resources. However, the use of virtualization also raises an interesting
security problem. Any honest-but-curious network infrastructure provider may snoop
on traffic sent by the virtual networks. Such snooping can reveal information about
which end-systems communicate with each other, what routes are used inside a vir-
tual network, etc. Note that this information is visible to the NI provider even if
cryptographic protocols are used by the end-systems since in existing networks end-
23
system addresses and forwarding tables have to be visible in order to perform packet
forwarding. Revealing such operational information may be undesirable for a vir-
tual network, in particular in large-scale networks that span multiple infrastructure
providers with whom establishing mutual trust relationships is difficult or impracti-
cal. Therefore, this work aims to provide a solution to provide privacy for virtual
networks in network virtualization.
The main idea of this work is to encrypt network addresses before they enter
the network infrastructure and decrypt them when they leave. Conventional crypto-
graphic techniques cannot be employed directly since the encrypted addresses could
not be used by a router’s forwarding engine. Therefore, we need to address three
fundamental questions in our system:
• How can we encrypt IP addresses such that inferences about traffic (e.g., the
same sources-destination pair) can be avoided?
• How can we encrypt IP addresses such that packet forwarding with conven-
tional routers (i.e., using longest prefix match) in the network infrastructure is
possible?
• How can we encrypt IP addresses such that the existing Internet Protocol (IP)
version 4 header can be used? (In our work, we focus on IPv4 so that we can
demonstrate our technique in a real network environment.)
As an answer to these questions, we present Encrypted IP (EncrIP), a protocol
that uses probabilistic encryption in a prefix-preserving manner to hide source and
destination information while still permitting packet forwarding using longest prefix
match. Using EncrIP, network infrastructure providers can forward packets without
gaining insights into the internal operation of virtual networks. The specific contri-
butions of our work are the following:
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• Design of encryption method that utilizes probabilistic encryption and prefix-
preservation to hide address information while allowing efficient packet forward-
ing.
• Prototype implementation of EncrIP on GENI using an unmodified IP header.
• Evaluation of resource requirements and security characteristics of EncrIP.
Our results show that EncrIP can be implemented using only a few MB of data on
gateways at the edge of the virtual network. Forwarding in the virtual network itself
can be performed without overhead. Our results show that the success probability
of a statistical inference attack, trying to identify which packets belong to the same
source-destination pair, is less than 0.001%. We therefore believe that EncrIP presents
an effective solution to providing privacy in virtualized networks. We begin our
discussion by first discussing the existing privacy schemes and compare them with
the proposed EncrIP technique.
3.1 Background
The problem of hosting network protocols and services on third-party infrastruc-
tures raises questions on the trustworthiness of the participating entities. Considering
the “honest-but-curious” model between the network entities, the VN does not want
to expose the data packet (header and payload) when processed by the NI. To put En-
crIP into context, we review other existing techniques for privacy and anonymization
in networks and compare them in Table 3.1:
• IPsec [63]: IPSec establishes a secure tunnel between gateways using the Encap-
sulating Security Payload (ESP) protocol suite. The entire packet (including
IP header) is encapsulated into another packet with unprotected source and
destination IP addresses. VPNs provide the required security and privacy to
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end-users by establishing a virtual private connection over the public Internet. A
secure VPN based on IPSec, SSL/TLS uses a combination of cryptographic func-
tions and tunneling mechanism to provide data confidentiality, data integrity
and authentication of end-users. While the technique provides effective user
privacy and payload encryption it incurs high processing overhead and requires
session maintenance using Internet Key Exchange (IKE). In addition, VPNs are
vulnerable to location privacy and are subjected to government crackdown in
some countries [78] wherein DNS poisoning was introduced to bring down some
popular VPN services. Also, when using a third-party VPN provider’s service,
the user should trust the VPN provider, who might log user behavior thereby
compromising user privacy and confidentiality.
• Tor [40]: Tor is a distributed overlay network that provides strong anonymity
guarantees against a global eavesdropper by constructing a network of virtual
tunnels that establish a private network path. The system establishes a ran-
dom pathway using intermediate, trusted Tor relays to provide the required
anonymity to the end-user. The connection setup requires a series of crypto-
graphic exchanges between the user and each intermediate Tor relay node in the
path thereby ensuring the reduction of traffic analysis performed by adversaries.
Unlike other anonymity systems, Tor can hide the originating source from the
participating relays as well, since each relay can see no more than one hop in
the path.
While Tor promises to be an effective solution in solving some of the anonymity
requirements (e.g., traffic analysis performed by ISPs, government class) in
the current Internet, there are various performance issues associated with this
system (cryptographic computations involved at each relay node and increased
latency overhead [82]), requires end-system software support, and is subjected
to government crackdown in some countries [105,106]. In addition, [66] exhibits
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how Tor users can be traced and profiled when used in conjunction with Bit-
torrent, peer-to-peer application.
• Address Hiding Protocol (AHP) [90]: AHP hides the source address of traffic in
cooperation with the ISPs, similar to “caller ID blocking” in telephone systems.
AHP uses a tweakable block cipher based encryption function to encrypt the IP
addresses at trusted gateway routers. While the technique has low overhead, it
can only guarantee source anonymity (no receiver anonymity and no location
privacy) and can cause collisions in long-lived flows. The technique introduces
the notion of two IP addresses hidden and sticky address to enable the feature
to work with certain peer-to-peer applications. AHP has resemblance to [107]
which provides location privacy in IPv6 addressing.
As explained in Chapter 2, the role of ISPs are envisioned to be separated
into VN and NI providers. In doing so, it is important to identify the role of
each network component in the architecture. The EncrIP technique that we
introduce in our work has similar goals with the AHP protocol, however, we
introduce a system that is suitable for the network virtualization environment
by providing the required anonymity to end-users from third-party network
infrastructure providers.
• Lightweight Anonymity and Privacy (LAP) [58]: LAP allows end-systems to
establish an encrypted path and forward packets on that path with low latency
overhead. With such a setting, the technique addresses the tradeoff between
the privacy levels achieved and the performance overhead introduced in the
system. LAP extensively discusses the technical requirements in achieving the
desired privacy and elaborates deployment considerations to work with different
next-generation network architectures. To provide backward compatibility with
the current Internet, LAP introduces the notion of heterogenous network that
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Table 3.1. Comparison of Existing Privacy Techniques with EncrIP.
VPN [63] Tor [40] AHP [90] LAP [58] AnonyFlow [72] EncrIP
Adversary eavesdropper eavesdropper end-system end-system end-system eavesdropper
Source anonymity yes yes yes yes yes yes
Receiver anonymity yes yes no yes no yes
Location privacy no yes no yes yes yes
Session unlinkability yes no no yes no yes
Payload encryption yes yes no no no no
Optimal routing yes no yes no yes yes
Commodity routers yes no yes no no yes
Processing overhead high high low low low low
Implementation gateways overlay gateways network gateways gateways
combines LAP enabled and legacy autonomous domains and tries to achieve the
desired security and performance. However, the technique considers a receiver
attacker model and supports session unlinkability by requesting new encrypted
paths for each session.
• AnonyFlow [72]: AnonyFlow proposes an in-network anonymization service (in
cooperation with a trusted network provider) that hides the source identifier
from the receiver. The technique addresses deployment challenges (e.g., sup-
port long-lived flows, multiple ingress/egress points) by maintaining a central-
ized global service. AnonyFlow does not provide receiver anonymity or session
unlinkability and requires specialized switches [70].
Comparing EncrIP to the other approaches for privacy, it is the only system that
can be implemented with commodity routers and still achieve location privacy. While
IPsec is most similar to EncrIP, the processing overhead for EncrIP is considerably
lower as we show in our results. Therefore, EncrIP presents a unique high-performance
privacy solution that provides session unlinkability.
3.2 Confidential Packet Forwarding
The problem of confidential packet forwarding in virtualized networks is illustrated
in Figure 3.1. When a virtual network is used to connect multiple subnetworks
(e.g., corporate campuses, etc.), the traffic sent via the network infrastructure can be
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Figure 3.1. Privacy problem in virtualized networks.
seen by the network infrastructure provider. In our work, we introduce a “gateway”
that encrypts network addresses so that the infrastructure provider no longer can
determine which end-system is communicating with which other end-system. The
presented approach can achieve this privacy more efficiently than IPsec and other
approaches and does not require any additional headers.
3.2.1 Security Requirements
To explicitly state the goals of our system and our assumptions about the attacker,
we briefly review our security model. The requirements for a confidential packet
forwarding system are:
• Address privacy: The identity of the communicating entities in the virtual
network should be concealed in the network infrastructure. In our case, this
means that the IP addresses of the source and the destination used by the
virtual network should not be visible in the network infrastructure.
• Session unlinkability: Packets with the same source-destination address pair
should not be linkable. That is, an attacker should not be able to determine if
any two packets have the same pair of source and destination addresses.
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• Routing privacy: Routing information should not reveal information about ad-
dress encryption.
Note that in this work we focus on network addresses and how to hide the infor-
mation inside them. Clearly, higher layer protocols also carry information that can
be used to link packets to the same session (e.g., port numbers). However, we assume
that appropriate security protocols are used to protect such information. Since higher
layers also often encrypt packet payloads (e.g., Transport Layer Security (TLS)), our
work only focuses on protecting network layer information.
3.2.2 Attacker Capabilities
In our system, we consider the network infrastructure provider to be the attacker
who aims to observe operational information from the hosted virtual networks. The
capabilities of the attacker are assumed to be:
• Full access to data plane: The attacker can see all data traffic in network
infrastructure.
• Full access to control plane: The attacker can see all forwarding tables and
routing information exchanges in the network infrastructure.
To allow for a practical solution to this problem, we need to limit the attacker’s
capabilities as follows:
• No access outside network infrastructure: The attacker cannot see or modify
traffic outside the network infrastructure, especially not on the gateways where
traffic transitions into and out of the network infrastructure.
• Honest-but-curious mode of operation: The network infrastructure is assumed
to implement forwarding correctly. Incorrect forwarding behavior (e.g., black
hole attack) can be detected by other techniques [12,39] and is outside the scope
of our work.
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3.2.3 Implementation and Performance Considerations
Based on the above security model, there are multiple possible solutions to provide
privacy, including those mentioned in related work. However, we also need to consider
how such solution can be implemented in a practical network. Therefore, we impose
the following additional requirements on our solution:
• Use with commodity routers: The system should allow the use of off-the-shelf
routers in the network core. Since routers use longest prefix match to determine
forwarding decisions, this requirement implies that any solution needs to main-
tain the prefix characteristics of the IP address space. Of course, gateway nodes
that translate between the virtual network and the network infrastructure do
not need to meet this requirement.
• Low processing overhead: The system should not require complex cryptographic
computations for every packet that is transmitted. Requiring such computa-
tional overhead would lower the network performance that can be achieved.
• Packet Forwarding Rate: The proposed encryption technique should not sig-
nificantly impact the performance of the lookup operation (packet forwarding
rate). Since packet forwarding is based on longest prefix match, the encryption
function should be prefix-preserving.
3.2.4 Encryption and Forwarding Process
Based on the above requirements and assumptions, we design a system that can
protect IP address information while still allowing efficient packet forwarding using
commodity hardware.
Conceptually, the operation of EncrIP is illustrated in Figure 3.2. In normal
IP packet forwarding, routers forward packet using a regular forwarding information
base (FIB). In EncrIP, packet addresses are first translated into the encrypted domain
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 Figure 3.2. Address encryption and decryption processing in EncrIP.
using address encryption, which results in packet that contain encrypted addresses.
These packets are then forwarded using a different forwarding information base where
prefixes are adjusted to match their encrypted representation. At the exit gateway,
the packet addresses are decrypted, which results in unencrypted packets having
reached the destination.
3.2.5 Design Choices for Encryption
There are many different ways of how the encryption and decryption process
could be implemented. One way to encrypt the IP addresses would involve mapping
each original address to a randomly chosen IP address, using a one-to-one mapping
technique. For example, a format-preserving encryption [19] is based on such an
approach. However, with such a method an adversary can still identify all packets
that belong to the same flow and hence this method does not meet our requirements.
To avoid a straightforward identification of packets from the same session, we need
to consider an encryption function that introduces some form of randomization.
Probabilistic encryption functions introduce such randomness in the encryption
process [57]. When the same input information is encrypted multiple times, different
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encrypted outputs are generated. Since the encryption needs to be reversible, the
output of probabilistic encryption is necessarily larger than the input. Thus, every
32-bit IP address is mapped to set of encrypted addresses of length 32 + x bits. (We
discuss in Section 3.3.5 how the x extra bit can be accommodated in the IP header.)
Fully Homomorphic Encryption (supports both addition and multiplication) has
theoretically proved to process the data in the encrypted domain without decrypt-
ing the input data [56]. All processing functions are performed in the encrypted
domain and hence the infrastructure is completely oblivious to the data being pro-
cessed. However the practical feasibility of the FHE technique to satisfy our protocol
processing requirements and challenges are unclear.
While probabilistic encryption does provide randomization to avoid session link-
ability, it does not exhibit the prefix-preserving nature that is necessary for using
longest prefix match during forwarding. In the next section, we describe our En-
crIP encryption technique that uses randomization and maintains prefix-relationships,
which is the main contribution of our work.
3.2.6 Assumptions
Before discussing the design of our EncrIP function, we enumerate the following
assumptions in our solution:
• In our work, we assume an honest-but-curious adversary model (e.g., statisti-
cal/passive inferences). For example, the NI providers are assumed to correctly
host the VN services but are curious in identifying the communicating entities
of a particular connection.
• Edge routers (gateways) in the network are assumed to be secure (operated by
the same administrative entity) and hence perform the required cryptographic
computations in the system.
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 Figure 3.3. Address Transformation in EncrIP.
• The VN provider securely stores the required prefix length information of all IP
addresses in the edge routers using a prefix tree data structure.
• Also, the VN provider securely installs the required encrypted addresses in the
forwarding table of the NI components.
• We consider the packet payloads and higher protocol header information to be
encrypted using conventional cryptographic protocols to achieve the required
end-to-end privacy.
• The EncrIP function design is proposed to work with IPv4 addressing, however,
the technique can be easily extended to work with IPv6 forwarding address
format by varying the tweakable parameter values proposed in the Section 3.3.
3.3 EncrIP: Probabilistic Prefix-Preserving Address Encryp-
tion
The overall process by which addresses are encrypted in EncrIP is illustrated
in Figure 3.3. Prefix-preserving encryption is used on the portion of the address
that needs to maintain prefix properties for forwarding. The number of bits affected
by this operation depends on the prefixes that are announced within the virtual
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network; the length of the longest prefix announced for a given address determines
the number of bits that are encrypted with prefix-preservation. The remaining bits
in the address are encrypted using probabilistic encryption. As mentioned above,
probabilistic encryption maps one cleartext to many ciphertexts. Thus, the output
of probabilistic encryption is longer than the input. As a result, the EncrIP address
requires additional bits. Note that the bits in the extra field are not necessary for
forwarding since they do not contain any information that needs to be matched for
longest prefix match.
Let the original address length be represented as n (IPv4 = 32 and IPv6 =128)
and the encrypted address length be m (m = n + x), where x > 0 represent the
length of extra bits in the encrypted address. Let p be the common prefix length
and t be the top-hashing length (discussed in section 3.3.2). Therefore, the EncrIP
function can be defined as: EncrIP : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m, where, an original address
′a′ is encrypted to output multiple encrypted addresses (b1, b2, ..., bi, ..., bj) as follows:
EncrIP (a) = [b1, b2, ..., bi, ..., bj ] (3.1)
such that the following properties are satisfied,
a1,...,t → b1,...,ti top hashing
bt+1i = b
t+1
j , ..., b
p
i = b
p
j prefix-preserving encryption
ap+1,...,n → bp+1,...,mi probabilistic encryption
1 ≤ i, j ≤ 2x number of encrypted addresses
In the next section, we discuss the functionalities of the probabilistic encryption
function and the prefix-preserving encryption tree used in our technique.
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Figure 3.4. EncrIP Function.
3.3.1 Probabilistic Encryption
Probabilistic encryption matches well with our security requirements since it in-
troduces randomness, which makes it more difficult for an attacker to link packets
that belong to the same session, thereby reducing the impact of statistical inferences
introduced by the NI components. Existing probabilistic encryption functions either
introduce high latency cryptographic computations [57] or are ineffective with respect
to the required compactness of the encrypted address length [45], and hence are not
suitable to be used in encrypting the forwarding addresses. To achieve the required
randomization, we propose a function with the following properties:
• An encryption function which introduces some form of randomness by con-
verting a deterministic encryption function into a probabilistic encryption [21].
However, the output should match a pseudo random number generator that
generates set of encrypted addresses with almost uniform distribution, such
as [69].
• A function that avoids collision, such that no two original addresses are mapped
to the same encrypted address.
Since the first p bits in the original address are required to maintain the prefix-
preserving property, the remaining n− p bits can be randomized to output multiple
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encrypted addresses. However, the encrypted address length (m = n+ x) determines
(constraints) the level of randomization achieved by the encryption function. The
EncrIP function randomizes the address bits as follows: Given an IP address with
prefix length p, the probabilistic encryption function considers the last n−p bits (i.e.,
p+1,...,n) in the original IP address and maps it to m− p bits (i.e., p+1,...,m) in the
encrypted address (ap+1,...,n → bp+1,...,mi ). For example, given an IP address with prefix
length /24, the last 8 bits in the original address are randomized to output the last
8 + x address bits in the encrypted address. For each incoming packet, the original
address bits are mapped to one of the 2x different encrypted addresses. Assuming an
uniform distribution, the identical encrypted address is generated after every 2x − 1
packets.
An Optimal Asymmetric Encryption Padding (OAEP) [21] algorithm is used to
generate the encryption output. This is done by first padding the input address
bits with random bits (using a pseudo random number generator [69]) and then
transforming them using a combination of asymmetric encryption (e.g., RSA) and
set of random oracles [20] (e.g., cryptographic hash functions) to generate the desired
encrypted address bits. The number of bits stored in the extra fields determines how
well an encrypted address holds up against statistical inference attack in the network
infrastructure. In section 3.5, we quantify this level of security. Next, we discuss the
prefix preserving encryption function which is required to encrypt the common prefix
bits in the original forwarding address.
3.3.2 Prefix-Preserving Encryption
A prefix-preserving transformation on an address (or part thereof) is defined as
follows:
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 Figure 3.5. Prefix-preserving encryption of addresses.
Definition 1 A function f is prefix-preserving if any two IP addresses a1 and a2 that
share a common p-bit prefix also share a p-bit prefix after transformation to f(a1) and
f(a2).
As discussed in [127] and [91], the only way to achieve prefix-preserving encryption
is to consider a binary prefix tree, T , where nodes indicate which bits need to be
flipped during transformation. A cryptographic function is used to determine the
state of each node in this “encryption tree” (i.e., white nodes indicating ‘0’ or no flip
and black nodes indicating flip or ‘1’). To encrypt an address, the tree is traversed
using the original address bit sequence and node values encountered are recorded.
The node values are then used in an exclusive-OR (XOR) operation to generate the
encrypted address (or address prefix) as illustrated in Figure 3.5. Since the colors
of the nodes in the tree are determined by a cryptographic function and cannot be
guessed, the output of the XOR function is encrypted.
In EncrIP, we do not use a full binary tree as has been done in [127] and [91].
Instead, we only use a tree that, for any given address, has a depth equal to the longest
matching prefix in any forwarding information base in the network. As illustrated
in Figure 3.6, the tree contains only p bits for each address, corresponding to the
announced prefix length in the network. The remaining 32−p bits (plus the extra
field) are randomized using probabilistic encryption.
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Figure 3.6. Encryption Tree in EncrIP.
3.3.3 Prefix Length Distribution
One key question is how deep the EncrIP encryption tree is for every possible
address. The values labeled “EncrIP” in Figure 3.7 shows a sample prefix length dis-
tribution of a routing table obtained from the RouteViews project [2] (Routing Table
Report, Japan View, RIB date 11/05/2011). One way to create the encryption tree is
to keep the full data structure in memory. This approach, however, may be expensive
to implement. Therefore, we propose two approaches to reduce implementation cost:
• Prefix expansion: To avoid the need to store many different prefix lengths, pre-
fix length can be expanded to certain predetermined levels. As a result, the
information about prefix lengths can be compressed more easily. We consider
three prefix expansion schemes: EncrIP-Coarse represents a four-level prefix
expansion scheme using prefix length /8, /16, /24 and /32; EncrIP-Mid repre-
sents a five-level expansion scheme using prefix lengths /8, /16, /21, /24 and
/32; EncrIP-Fine represents a six level expansion scheme using prefix lengths
/8, /16, /21, /24, /30 and /32. The prefix expansion schemes with varying
number of expansion levels as shown in Table 3.2
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Figure 3.7. IPv4 Prefix Length Distribution.
• Dynamic computation of node colors: Instead of storing the encryption tree in
memory, it is also possible to dynamically calculate the node colors based on the
cryptographic function used to color the nodes. This approach reduces memory
requirements to nearly zero, but generates computational overhead. For some
gateway nodes with low data rates and limited memory, this tradeoff may be
suitable.
In the remainder of this chapter, we only consider prefix expansion as one possible
improvement. While prefix expansion decreases the amount of memory required for
the encryption tree in the gateway router, the IP addresses are matched with longer
prefixes and hence the number of prefixes that need to be maintained in the network
infrastructure increases. Also, the session unlinkability property suffers since the
length of the probabilistically encrypted address portion decreases. We evaluate this
tradeoff in more detail in Section 3.5.
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Table 3.2. Prefix Expansion Levels
Feature Name Prefix Expansion Level
EncrIP Original prefix length
EncrIP-Coarse /8,/16,/24,/32
EncrIP-Mid /8,/16,/21,/24,/32
EncrIP-Fine /8,/16,/21,/24,/30,/32
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Figure 3.8. Top-Hashing based EncrIP Function.
3.3.4 Top Hashing
One security concern with the above prefix tree is that nodes in T that are close
to the root node can compromise the original/encrypted IP address mapping. For
example, if the color of the top node in T is known, then the attacker can identify the
first bit of all encrypted addresses in the address space. Therefore, maintaining prefix-
properties at the top of the prefix tree leads to easy inference attacks. To address
this problem, a technique call “top-hashing” [91] can be used to encrypt the first t
bits of the address without using a tree but a 2t → 2t cryptographic, collision-free
hash function, as shown in Figure 3.8. Top-hashing removes any correlation between
prefixes in the first t bits and thereby improves the level of security achieved in T .
The top-hashing scheme uses a cryptographic function to encrypt the first t bits
in the original address (precomputed and stored in T ), as shown in Figure 3.9. This
ensures that the first t bits in the encrypted address are unique for each original
address. A hash function clearly does not preserve prefixes, but as Figure 3.7 shows,
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Figure 3.10. Encrypted IP Header.
there are no prefixes with a length less than 8 bits. Thus, values of up to t = 8 do
not cause any practical problems.
3.3.5 EncrIP in IP Protocol Header
Since probabilistic encryption of addresses requires more space than the original
32 bits, a key question is where to store the additional data. As shown in Figure 3.10,
we can use the 16-bit identification field to store two 8-bit extra fields – one for
the source address and one for the destination address. The requirement for the
identification field is that its value is unique for a given sender-destination pair within
a maximum packet lifetime. Since we use probabilistic encryption, which generates
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pseudo-random values for this field, it can be argued that there is a probabilistic
guarantee that the same value does not get repeated within a packet lifetime (except
for high data rate flows, for which the conventional IP protocol has the same problem).
Thus, EncrIP can be implemented in the standard IP header without the need to use
any options or redefining the use of any fields.
3.4 Complete EncrIP Process
To realize EncrIP, there are several operations that need to be performed in the
data plane and the control plane.
3.4.1 Data Plane
Based on the techniques described above, the encryption process for an address
is as follows: (1) encrypt the first t bits of the original address using the top hashing
scheme, (2) encrypt the next p− t bits of the original address using the lookup opera-
tion in the encryption tree T , (3) encrypt the next 32−p bits of the IP address using
the probabilistic encryption function, to output one of the 2x possible encryptions of
length 32− p+ x, (4) concatenate the encrypted t, p− t, 32− p+ x bits to generate
the final encrypted address consisting of 32 bits used in forwarding and x bits used
in the extra field.
Correspondingly, the decryption process is as follows: (1) receive the encrypted
address consisting of 32 + x bits, (2) extract the first t bits and decrypt using the
reverse top hashing function, (3) traverse the decryption tree T ′, which is derived
from T , to determine the prefix length p and decrypt the next p − t bits from the
encrypted address, (4) extract the next 32 − p + x bits in the address and decrypt
using the probabilistic decryption function to retrieve the final 32 − p bits in the
original address, (5) concatenate the bits from the above steps to obtain the cleartext
address.
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3.4.2 Control Plane and Setup
To set up EncrIP in a virtual network, the VN operator only needs to enable
the EncrIP gateways to perform address encryption for traffic that is sent to the
untrusted network infrastructure and address decryption for traffic that is received.
This requires that all EncrIP gateways compute the encryption tree T and its inverse
T ′. Since the tree construction can be done with a cryptographic function, the only
requirements is that the gateways have a shared secret (or set up this shared secret
through a secure protocol).
In addition, the network infrastructure needs to obtain routing information for the
encrypted prefixes so that the forwarding information bases in routers can be set up.
One of the great benefits of EncrIP is that this can be done very easily. The gateway
nodes simply advertise the encrypted version of each prefix to the network infrastruc-
ture using conventional routing protocols (since these protocols cannot distinguish
between a cleartext prefix and ciphertext prefix).
Thus, EncrIP does not require any changes to the data plane operation or con-
trol plane operation of the network infrastructure or the end-systems. All EncrIP
functionality is implemented in EncrIP gateways.
3.4.3 Limitations
While EncrIP meets our security requirements to provide privacy in the network
infrastructure, there are a few limitations:
• No support for flow-based operations in network infrastructure: Some systems
need to identify which packets belong to the same flow to operate correctly
(e.g., content inspection across packet boundaries). However, our requirement
for session unlinkability inherently prevents such systems from being used in
the network infrastructure.
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• Changing prefix lengths: In dynamic networks, the length of prefixes can change
in case a subnetwork is broken up into multiple parts. EncrIP needs to know
prefix lengths to compute what portions of the address are encrypted with
prefix-preserving encryption and with probabilistic encryption. Thus, the en-
cryption tree needs to be updated when prefixes become longer.
• Profile-based inference attacks: We discuss in Section 3.5 how well EncrIP
protects from statistical inference attacks, where an attacker tries to determine
which packets belong to the same flow. There are profiling techniques that can
determine the relationship and content of encrypted packets [23], which could
be used to more effectively attack some EncrIP traffic.
We believe that these limitations do not present significant hurdles as they can be
mitigated in any practical deployment of EncrIP.
3.5 Evaluation and Analysis
We are evaluating the effectiveness and performance of EncrIP in two ways. First,
we present results from an analysis of EncrIP based on Internet routing information.
Second, we present results from a prototype implementation. Our analysis focuses on
the required gateway memory and prefix overhead as well as the security properties
achieved by EncrIP. For our analysis, we consider the real world prefix length distri-
butions obtained from the RouteViews project [2] (Routing Table Report for London,
Japan and RouteViews-3 view, RIB date 11/05/11) and from the BGP routing table
analysis report [31] (AS6447 and AS65000). The top-hash length is set to t = 7 bits,
the prefix lengths vary within p = 8 . . . 32 bits, and the encrypted address length is
set to 32 + x = 40 bits.
45
Table 3.3. Memory Requirements on EncrIP Gateways
Routing Memory in MB
Table EncrIP EncrIP-Fine EncrIP-Mid EncrIP-Coarse
London 5.32 3.96 3.62 3.60
Japan 5.38 4.02 3.80 3.68
Routeviews-3 5.41 4.13 3.87 3.71
AS65000 5.48 4.24 3.98 3.85
AS6447 5.66 4.48 4.07 3.92
Table 3.4. Prefix Overhead of Expansion Schemes
Routing Number of Prefixes and Overhead)
Table EncrIP EncrIP-Fine EncrIP-Mid EncrIP-Coarse
London 374K 786K (2.09×) 792K (2.11×) 3.17M (8.45×)
Japan 380K 854K (2.24×) 1050K (2.75×) 3.43M (9.00×)
Routeviews-3 384K 812K (2.11×) 830K (2.16×) 3.29M (8.57×)
AS65000 381K 858K (2.24×) 1063K (2.78×) 3.44M (9.02×)
AS6447 394K 857K (2.17×) 976K (2.47×) 3.46M (8.79×)
3.5.1 Gateway Memory and Prefix Overhead
An EncrIP gateway needs to maintain the encryption tree, which also contains the
information of how long each prefix is. The memory requirements are calculated based
on the prefix length distribution for each routing table report and for the different
prefix expansion levels discussed in Section 3.3.3: EncrIP (no expansion), EncrIP-
Fine, EncrIP-Mid, and EncrIP-Coarse. We determine the total memory required for
T as follows: Each node in T holds 1-bit of information. The top hashing scheme
totally consists of 2t nodes and each top hash node lead to a subtree of size 2p−t− 1.
Table 3.3 shows the total memory required by EncrIP gateways for the different prefix
length distributions. From the table, we see that expansion reduces the amount of
memory required since prefix length information can be stored more effectively.
However, prefix expansion comes at the cost of creating additional prefixes. Ta-
ble 3.4 shows the number of prefixes that are present in the original EncrIP method
and each of the expansion schemes (and the overhead compared to EncrIP). We ob-
serve that EncrIP-Fine and EncrIP-Mid require two to three times the number of
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Figure 3.11. Attack probability vs. gateway memory.
prefixes that EncrIP requires, which may be acceptable in practice to save memory
in the gateways.
3.5.2 Probability of Successful Attack
The goal of an attacker is to correctly map an encrypted IP address to the original
IP address (i.e., violating the requirement of address privacy) or identifying separate
packets that belong to the same flow (i.e., violating the requirement of session un-
linkability). Since the latter is simpler for an attacker, we focus on attacking session
unlinkability property of EncrIP. As the attacker does not know the encryption tree,
the only practical attack is based on statistical inference. Thus, the attacker snoops
the set of packets that share a common prefix of length p and then randomly guesses
the encrypted-to-original address mapping in the remaining m − p bits in the en-
crypted address. With this strategy, the probability of a successful attack depends
on the probability of two encryptions of the same address being identical.
Since p bits in the encrypted address are known to the attacker (based on attacker
strategy of snooping sets of packets with common prefix), the problem is reduced
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to guessing which of the remaining 232−p+x − 1 addresses correspond to one of the
remaining 2x − 1 representations of the original address. Thus, the probability of a
successful attack is given by P [successful attack] = 2
x
−1
232−p+x−1
.
The attack probability for different route tables and expansion schemes is shown
in comparison to gateway memory requirements in Figure 3.11 and in comparison
to prefix expansion overhead in Figure 3.12. We observe that the attack probability
is lowest for EncrIP because no expansion is used and the range of bits on which
probabilistic encryption can be applied is maximized. EncrIP, however, also requires
most memory in the gateway. EncrIP-Fine and EncrIP-Mid, provide marginally lower
protection from attacks, but require less memory while only increasing the number
of prefixes by a factor of two. EncrIP-Coarse introduces a large prefix overhead
without reducing the memory cost significantly over EncrIP-Mid. Therefore, EncrIP
and EncrIP-Fine seem to be the best choices for a practical deployment.
The generalized probability of successfully identifying all the encrypted addresses
mapped to the same original address is given by (where i varies from 1 to 2x − 1):
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P (Attack)all =
∏
i
(
2x − i
232−p+x − i
)
(3.2)
Figure 3.13 shows the probability of successful attack (P (Attack)2) for varying
prefix length.
3.5.3 Entropy
The entropy in our work determines the level of randomization provided by the en-
cryption function. We assume that packets with common prefix length arrive equally
likely from different sources and hence the rate at which the NI component receives
an identical packet of prefix p is given by 1
2m−p
. Therefore the entropy of the proposed
encryption function is given by the Shannon entropy formula as follows:
H(X) =
2m−p∑
i=1
P (Xi) ∗ log2P (Xi) (3.3)
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where P (Xi) =
1
2m−p
. Figure 3.14 shows the entropy of the encryption function
for varying prefix length and impact of entropy when prefix expansion is considered.
For smaller common prefix bits, the level of randomization is higher and as the prefix
size increases the entropy decreases linearly.
3.6 Prototype Implementation
We implemented EncrIP using the ProtoGENI experimental testbed [77]. For
experimentation, we set up a network topology consisting of 11 virtual network end-
system nodes, 3 gateway nodes, and 16 network infrastructure nodes. The encryp-
tion/decryption prefix trees were generated using SHA-1 and probabilistic encryption
was implemented use OAEP. Forwarding tables on routers were set up using encrypted
prefixes. EncrIP traffic used the standard IP header as described in Section 3.3.5.
The main result from the prototype system is that EncrIP traffic was forwarded
correctly between end-systems using unmodified routers in the network infrastructure.
50
Table 3.5. Per-Packet Processing Latency on Gateway for EncrIP and IPsec
Operation
EncrIP IPsec ESP-Tunnel mode (µs)
(µs) 3DES AES128 AES256
Encryption 81 316 214 222
Decryption 80 293 198 201
We have also measured the processing latency and vulnerability to statistical inference
attacks.
3.6.1 EncrIP Processing Latency
We have measured the per-packet processing time that a gateway spends to per-
form EncrIP encryption and decryption. The results are shown in Table 3.5. As a
comparison, processing times are also shown for different variants of IPsec tunneling.
Note that EncrIP is considerably faster since only addresses need to be modified. In
addition, IPsec also incurs additional initial latency due to Internet Key Exchange
(IKE) operations. Thus, in virtual networks, where address privacy and session un-
linkability need to be achieved and data rates are high, EncrIP is clearly a better
choice.
Note that these processing times are obtained from software-based router systems.
In practice, high-performance network-processor-based implementations are expected
to be considerably faster.
3.6.2 Statistical Inference Attacks
Finally, we evaluate the probability with which an attacker successfully can deter-
mine that addresses (or an address pair) from two different packets match. Since we
use 8 extra bits per address, it can be expected that encrypted addresses need to be
repeated every 28 = 256 packets. When looking at address pairs, a repetition can be
expected every 2(8+8) = 65536 packets. To verify this expectation with measurement,
we initiated TCP connections from five different end-system nodes to five different
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Figure 3.15. Statistical Inference Attack.
end-systems, each. At a router in the infrastructure, we recorded all incoming packets
to determine the sets of identical addresses observed.
Figure 3.15 shows the total number of identical source address, destination ad-
dresses, and source and destination address pairs received for varying numbers of
incoming packets. Since the source communicates to multiple destinations via the
chosen core router (i.e., creating five flows with same source address), the number of
identical source addresses received is higher than the number of identical destination
addresses. For a total of 1 million incoming packets, we observed only 3 packets with
the same source and destination address pair, which leads to a session linkability of
less than 0.001%. In practical deployments with more active network connections and
more short-lived flows, the probability of identifying packets belonging to the same
session drops even lower. This confirms the effectiveness of EncrIP to provide address
privacy and session unlinkability.
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3.7 Related Work
The use of network virtualization introduces new security issues (e.g., privacy
and integrity of hosted virtual networks, side-channel attacks between virtual net-
works, etc.) [75]. There have been several approaches to explicitly managing trust
in this environment. A trust management framework that allows service providers
(virtual networks) to identify trustworthy infrastructure providers based on their past
experiences and feedback is proposed in [71]. To address accountability in hosting
virtual networks, violation detection using processor extensions and network mea-
surements to monitor service-level agreements are introduced in [61]. The lack of
operational confidentiality when hosting virtual networks on third-party network in-
frastructure can be addressed using minimum disclosure routing [55], which extends
Secure Multiparty Computation [29] to allow multiple NI providers to compute the
routing decisions using only local routing information. These techniques are comple-
mentary to our work since they address the problem of trust, but do not present any
solution for protecting operational information in the data plane of virtual network
infrastructure.
While some attention has been devoted to developing security solutions to attacks
and vulnerabilities in the Internet architecture, only recently attempts have been
made to address the privacy concerns of end-users in the Internet architecture. Ref-
erence [115] shows the list of ISPs that introduce hidden traffic shaping techniques on
peer-to-peer protocols. Such activities indicate the requirement to examine security
issues, when hosting virtual networks on third-party network infrastructures. Current
solutions to address the user privacy issue either propose a clean slate approach [68]
or provide an overlay network over the current Internet architecture (Tor) [40]. Par-
ticularly, Tor promises to be an effective solution in anonymizing the source and
destination addresses of the communicating entities. However, the technique has
undesirable performance issues and is subjected to government crackdown in some
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countries [105]. Reference [90] introduces an Address Hiding Protocol (AHP) to
anonymize the forwarding addresses by deploying the technique in cooperation with
the ISPs. Reference [96] proposes an hash-based IP address anonymization technique
that can improve the privacy issue in the current Internet architecture.
Secure tunneling protocol techniques (e.g., VPN) provide the required confiden-
tiality of the data by encapsulating the packet payload. However, a detailed dis-
cussion on the limitations of such schemes were discussed earlier. Message Stream
Encryption (MSE) protocol obfuscates the header and payload data to ensure the
provision of confidentiality and authentication. To avoid biased management prac-
tices by ISPs, BitTorrent protocol versions introduced MSE based protocol encryption
that enhances privacy and confidentiality [116]. However, [28] shows various potential
vulnerabilities that can compromise the working of the MSE protocol.
Related to privacy in the data plane of a network is the problem of anonymization
of network measurement traces. Prefix-preserving anonymization has been used to
provide anonymity while still allowing analysis of traces [91, 127]. Anonymization of
packet headers and payloads using trace transformations based on a programming
environment for policy scripts was introduced in [83]. A cryptographic technique to
scramble the host part of IP addresses in traces was introduced in [86]. An obfuscation
algorithm using a many-to-one mapping between IP addresses and group-ID values
was proposed in [94] to protect the sensitive data in network flows. While these
anonymization techniques are effective with respect to network measurement and
trace collection systems, they do not meet our security requirements – in particular
session unlinkability. EncrIP does, however, borrow some ideas from prefix-preserving
anonymization in order to allow use of commodity routers.
Our work, proposes an encryption technique that ensures the provision of con-
fidential packet forwarding of network traffic in virtualized networks. We provide
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a platform where the NI components are oblivious to the VN forwarding address
information, thereby improving the confidentiality and privacy in the system.
3.8 Summary
In this chapter, we have identified the need for providing privacy for the op-
erational information in virtual networks that are hosted on a third-party infras-
tructure. We have presented EncrIP, an IP address encryption scheme, that uses
prefix-preserving encryption and probabilistic encryption to hide address information
while still allowing forwarding using unmodified IP headers and commodity routers.
Our evaluation shows that gateways require only a few MB of memory to imple-
ment EncrIP and that in practice the probability of correctly identifying two packets
belonging to the same flow is less than 0.001%. The implementation results show
that EncrIP introduces low per-packet processing latency. Thus, EncrIP provides a
practical solution to privacy in virtualized networks.
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CHAPTER 4
CAPABILITIES-BASED VIRTUAL NETWORK
INSTANCE
In this chapter, a capabilities-based virtual network instance is proposed which
introduces data path credentials to authorize legitimate network access and curtail at-
tack traffic. Some initial ideas on this topic have been published in prior work, which
includes an overview of the architecture [121] (which was developed in the context of
the IAMANET project [6]), two short papers on the use of Bloom filters [122, 123],
and some initial results of the prototype system [125]. My contribution to this work
is to provide detail analysis on the unicast, multicast and network coding scenarios,
introduce the group credentials based network architecture, provide extensive security
analysis, validate the security requirements by developing new prototype implementa-
tion, and perform experimental evaluation using Emulab that exhibits the robustness
of the proposed technique against attack traffic.
4.1 Introduction
Capabilities-based networks present a fundamental shift in the security design of
network architectures. Instead of permitting the transmission of packets from any
source to any destination, routers deny forwarding by default. For a successful trans-
mission, packets need to positively identify themselves and their permissions to the
router. A major challenge for a high-performance implementation of such a network
is an efficient design of the credentials that are carried in the packet and the ver-
ification procedure on the router. Recent proposals for capabilities-based networks
56
have provided some ideas on the fundamental shift in the design philosophy of net-
works by moving from the Internet’s “on-by-default” principle to an “off-by-default”
assumption. In an off-by-default network, a connection needs to be explicitly autho-
rized to reach an end-system rather than being allowed to connect to an end-system
by default. Authorization is based on capabilities, which are tokens that represent
authority for a particular operation. During the connection setup and data transfer, a
connection’s capabilities are validated along the connection path. Existing designs of
these capabilities-based networks vary in terms of how capabilities are issued, where
in the network capabilities are verified, and how the capabilities are implemented.
One key shortcoming of these approaches is that verification takes place only at
one node (or a small number of nodes) in the network and thus malicious traffic can
travel several hops, absorb resources, and possibly attack nodes before being filtered.
In this proposal, we present a capabilities-based protocol that performs verification
on every hop in the network. Our system is based on a novel design of capabilities,
which we call “data path credentials (DPCP).” These credentials can be validated
easily in the data path of routers and thus allow high-performance implementations.
Therefore, we can check capabilities on every hop and effectively contain most attack
traffic within one hop from its source.
An important question that is addressed in this work is how to design a network
that can inherently guarantee that only authorized traffic is transmitted. Denial-of-
service attacks and intrusion attacks, which are not authorized, should be contained
as close to their source as possible. Blocking unauthorized traffic in the network
serves two purposes:
• Protection of end-systems: End-systems may be vulnerable to DoS attacks and
intrusion attacks. Eliminating attack traffic inside the network can help protect
these systems.
57
Figure 4.1. Security in Existing Internet Architecture.
• Protection of infrastructure: The effects of large amounts of DoS traffic in the
network can have detrimental effects on otherwise unrelated traffic since link
resources are shared. Eliminating DoS traffic inside the network can reduce
these effects.
Thus, it is important that (1) attack traffic does not reach the end-system and that
(2) attack traffic is squelched as close to the source as possible. The latter is one
of the main distinctions of our work, which focuses on 1-hop containment, i.e., the
elimination of most attack traffic within a single hop from the source.
The overall work shows that it is feasible to implement networks that use a
capabilities-based approach to verify packets on every hop and thus inherently can
limit the impact of malicious traffic. We begin the discussion of our system with a
description of the overall network and router architecture for our capabilities system,
which we call “data path credentials,” and explain the system design and operation
in more detail. The specific design of credentials is discussed in Section 4.3.
4.1.1 Network Architecture
The network architecture that we propose is depicted in Figure 4.3 and compared
to conventional data networks in Figure 4.1 and existing capabilities-based networks
in Figure 4.2. Nodes shown in blue indicate intermediate nodes in the forwarding
path that do not have any inherent security provision. Nodes shown in orange indicate
capabilities-based verification mechanisms. The key idea is to augment network traffic
with credentials that can be audited in the data path on every hop. Each router
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Figure 4.2. Existing Capabilities-Based Network Architectures.
Figure 4.3. Credential-Based Data Path Architecture.
performs a credential check and thus can positively identify traffic that is eligible for
forwarding. Attack traffic with invalid credentials is discarded.
This approach contrasts to the traditional Internet architecture insofar that se-
curity protocols are not constrained solely to end-systems (e.g., cryptographic proto-
cols) or isolated routers (e.g., firewalls or intrusion detection systems). Instead, all
routers along the data path of a connection participate in validating traffic and thus
defending against attacks. In addition, end-system security protocols can provide
orthogonal security features of confidentiality and integrity. In comparison to exist-
ing capabilities-based networks, packet validation is not limited to just a few nodes
along the path (e.g., “verification points” in [9], edge routers in [59], or LAN switches
in [30]), but performed everywhere. This increases the responsiveness of the network
to attacks. To illustrate the operation of credentials in the data in more detail, we
turn to the functionality implemented on routers.
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Figure 4.4. Design of a Router System with Data Path Credentials.
4.1.2 Router Architecture
The system architecture of a router that implements data path credentials is shown
in Figure 4.4. To simplify the explanation, conventional packet forwarding functions,
which remain unchanged, are not shown.
In the control path, connections are managed and credentials are created. An
end-system can request credentials for a particular flow. These credentials are then
computed based on the flow characteristics and the router’s cryptographic key. More
details on this process are discussed in Section 4.3. The resulting credentials are then
transmitted back to the end-system and stored in the local credentials cache.
In the data path, packet headers are augmented to carry the credentials provided
by the sending end-system. When a packet is received on the router for forwarding,
the packet is first classified to identify which flow it belongs to. Then the credentials
that were generated by the router are retrieved from the credentials cache. If the cre-
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dentials match those in the packet, the packet is considered valid and thus forwarded.
If the credentials do not match, then the packet is discarded.
If credentials cannot be found in the local credentials cache, it may be due to
the limited size of the cache or due to an invalid packet. It is possible to trigger a
credentials recomputation (dashed lines in Figure 4.4) before discarding the packet.
This process may increase the systems vulnerability to denial of service (DoS) attacks
since the cryptographic computation of credentials is an expensive operation. It is
therefore important that that the cache is sufficiently large and that new credential
requests take priority over recomputations. A more extensive discussion on how to
defend against DoS attacks can be found in Section 4.5.1.
Since the router classifies packets by connection, a possible extension of our work
could differentiate packets from different connections. For example, if quality of
service (QoS) is considered, then QoS parameters and flow state can be stored in
conjunction with credentials information. After a packet has been identified as be-
longing to a particular flow and containing valid credentials, it could be forwarded
through the router based on its QoS requirements (e.g., by placing it in the high-
priority output queue). These QoS parameters would need to be configured at the
time of connection setup based on policies (see Section 4.2.4).
4.2 Connection Management
Connection management is an important aspect of our architecture since it ad-
dresses one of the key problems that appeared in prior designs of networks using ca-
pabilities [15]. The control path of such networks pose as potential target for denial
of service attacks [10]. In our design, connection setup is performed as an incremental
process (as shown in Figure 4.5 and further explained below). An end-system cannot
send a credentials request to a router unless it has valid credentials for the entire
path up to that router. Thus, any DoS attempt on the control infrastructure can
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Figure 4.5. Connection Setup to Establish Credentials.
only target router immediately neighboring the attacker. A propagation of the DoS
attack is not possible (unless the source can properly identify itself as an authorized
end-system, in which case the DoS attack can be traced back and squelched by other
means).
In this work, we consider three commonly used communication paradigms to il-
lustrate the generality of the data path credentials concept: unicast, multicast, and
network coding.
4.2.1 Unicast
An example of the connection establishment process for unicast is sketched in
the space-time diagram shown in Figure 4.5. In this scenario, an end-system sends
a request to establish a connection to the first of three routers in order to obtain
credentials. The router may challenge the end-system to authenticate itself and may
negotiate access policies. Once the router has determined that the end-system is eli-
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Figure 4.6. Connection Setup: Unicast Scenario.
gible to transmit data across the router, it provides credentials C1. These credentials
need to be included in all further transmissions that traverse the router including
the credentials request to router 2. Finally, the set of all credentials (C1, C2, and
C3 in the example shown in Figure 4.5) is then carried in each data packet. Each
data packet is checked on every router. If the set of credentials contains the correct
instance for a particular router, the packet is forwarded. If the credentials do not
match, the packet is discarded.
Clearly, having to exchange several messages with every router along a path in
order to establish a single connection is a costly proposition. There are two approaches
that can reduce this overhead:
• Credential Reuse: If multiple connections are established between two end-
systems (either in parallel or within a given time window), credentials could be
reused.
• Group Credentials: It is possible to create group credentials (e.g., for all routers
within an autonomous system) where any router can issue credentials that are
valid to traverse any set of routers in that group. In such a case, the number of
credential requests per connection can be reduces significantly (as illustrated in
Figure 4.10). More details on these credentials can be found in Section 4.3.6.
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Figure 4.7. Connection Setup: Multicast and Multipath Scenario.
4.2.2 Multicast
To illustrate the versatility of the credentials-based data path design, we also con-
sider credentials in usage scenarios that go beyond unicast: multicast (and multipath)
and network coding. These communication modes are illustrated in the following sec-
tion. In unicast, (Figure 4.6), the set of credentials includes only those along the path
from source to destination. In multicast/multipath, packets get duplicated inside the
network (as illustrated in Figure 4.7). With the duplication of a packet, its credentials
get duplicated, too. Thus, the source needs to include credentials for all routers that
may be traversed along the multicast tree / multipath graph.
4.2.3 Network coding
Reference [4] introduces a recently proposed approach to improving end-to-end
data transmissions in wireless networks. Packets traverse multiple paths to the des-
tination and may be coded together with other transmissions. At the receiver these
operations are reversed to obtain the original packets. In such a usage scenario, data
path credentials from both sources need to be combined (shown as dashed lines in
Figure 4.8). While some routers may overlap in the coded packets’ paths, flow iden-
tifiers are different and thus credentials are different. Therefore, all credentials from
both sources need to be added into the set of credentials carried by the packet.
Clearly, there are cases where a large number of credentials are necessary to guar-
antee successful forwarding by all participating routers. In Section 4.3, we show that
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Figure 4.8. Connection Setup: Network Coding Scenario.
our design of credentials only requires constant space for most practical scenarios.
In particular, we do not require space that increases linearly with the number of
credentials that need to be provided. Thus, the above scenarios can be implemented
efficiently. The security analysis in Section 4.4 provides quantitative performance and
security tradeoffs for each of these scenarios.
4.2.4 Identity Management, Authentication and Access Control
For a realistic deployment of the proposed architecture, it is important to consider
how identities are managed, how authentication is performed, and how access control
is used to authorize network access. For our credential-based data path architecture,
it is possible to use existing concepts and protocols to address these issues. Our
proposed capabilities-based network is agnostic about the specifics of how identities
and policies are implemented and managed.
In order for policies to be implemented in a meaningful way, it is necessary to
have well-defined identities. In networks, there are many possible ways of defining
identities, ranging from using network-specific identifiers for identity-based cryptog-
raphy [25] to more broadly defined identities [93]. In our system, our only assumption
about identities is that identities have key pairs for public-key/private-key cryptog-
raphy available. We also assume that public keys are properly distributed through a
Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) [85] or a more complex federated trust model [22].
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In our work, we use the term “end-system” and “user” interchangeably to identify an
entity that is the source or sink of a network connection.
To implement policies, we assume a conventional access control system (e.g., role-
based access control [53]) to determine the access privileges of a particular entity. To
support dynamic updates, a policy-based management systems [3] could be used for
interactions between a policy manger and managed resources. In our context, the
policy controller could be used to express which entities have access to a particular
network of routers (i.e., managed resources) that implement these policies. These
policies could be expressed using the Common Information Model (CIM) standardized
by the Distributed Management Task Force (DMTF). A specific policy system in the
context of access control to networks is Zodiac [34].
Authentication, authorization, and access control decisions are made by routers
during connection setup. Figure 4.5 shows only a single exchange of packets for this
process, but it is conceivable that a more extensive exchange takes place to establish
access privileges. Once this process has been completed, data path credentials are
used to enforce these network access policies by validating each packet on each hop
of the route. Thus, the overhead for policy verification is limited to the connection
setup phase.
4.3 Credentials Design
With the concept of credentials in the data path introduced in the previous section,
we turn to the question of what these credentials look like specifically.
4.3.1 Requirements
The requirements for credentials are driven by several conflicting needs:
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1. Security Requirement: In order to provide a secure network infrastructure, it is
crucial that credentials are only available to authorized traffic in the network.
Therefore, credentials should be difficult to fake.
2. Performance Requirement: Since credentials need to be validated for every
packet on every router, it is necessary that credentials can be validated with
low computational requirements.
3. Size Requirement: Since credentials for every router along the path of a con-
nection need to be carried in each packet header, it is crucial that total size of
all credentials is limited.
While the first requirement can be addressed by traditional cryptographic solu-
tions, it is the second and third requirements that pose a novel set of challenges. As
networks connect an increasing number of embedded devices (both as end-systems
and as intermediate hops), power constraints are becoming increasingly important.
Cryptographic operations require several orders of magnitude more operations than
conventional packet processing and thus need to be limited to the initial connection
setup.
An implication from the third requirement is that it is not practical to simply
chain all credentials in the header of the packet. A limit on the header size would
constrain the maximum hop count along a path (or the size of the multicast tree).
Therefore, we seek a solution where credentials can be represented by a single fixed-
length data structure. In addition, chained credentials (e.g., as used in SIFF [128])
are also vulnerable to an attack where routers are incrementally probed (similar to
how traceroute works). In each step, an attacker only needs to try a few possible bit
combinations until a router can be bypassed and the next one can be probed. Thus,
chained credentials may not meet the first requirement.
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4.3.2 Bloom Filters based Credentials Data Structure
To meet the above requirements, we introduce a credentials data structure that
is based on Bloom filters. The main idea is that this data structure can maintain
multiple credentials at the same time. When the packet is transmitted, each router
can check if its own credentials are present in the data structure and thus validate
the packet.
We briefly review the concept of Bloom filters to provide context for our work.
Bloom filters can be used to store membership information [24]. Specifically, a
Bloom filter is a bit array that can store m bits. Using k different hash functions
h1(x) . . . hk(x), an element x is mapped to k bit position in the array. An empty
Bloom filter data structure starts with all array values set to 0. When adding ele-
ment x, the bits corresponding to the hash function values for element x are set to 1.
As multiple elements are added, it is possible (and intended) that set bits overlap (i.e.,
are combined with a logical OR function). When performing a check for membership
of an element, the hash functions for the element are computed and it is checked if the
according bits in the array are set. Only if all of these bits are set to 1, the element is
reported to be a member of the set. The membership test is of a probabilistic nature
and false positives are possible (i.e., elements that are not members of the set may be
reported to be members), but false negatives are not (i.e., elements that are members
of the set will never be reported as not being members). One of the properties of a
Bloom filter is that it is not possible to perform a reverse operation where the list of
members is extracted from the Bloom filter data structure.
Since the data structure allows that set bits from different elements can collide
in the array, it is possible that an element that is not a member of the set may be
reported as being a member. This occurs when the hash functions of this element
map to bits that have been set by other members in the array (i.e., k collisions). The
probability of this occurring increases as more members are added to the set (i.e., n
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increases and thus more bits are set). By using a larger array (i.e., larger m) this
probability can be decreased. We derive the exact value for this probability in the
security analysis in Section 4.4.
4.3.3 Credentials Aggregation
To use the Bloom filter data structure as data path credentials for packets that
traverse the network, we store credentials from each router along the path. As ex-
plained previously, the source node of a connection negotiates permission to transmit
data across a router during connection setup. When router j (1≤j≤n) permits trans-
mission, it provides the source with its router credentials rj. Router credentials are
the set of indices rj [i] (1≤i≤k) of bits that are set in the Bloom filter array. The
credentials from all routers along the path are then superimposed (i.e., logical OR
operation) in the Bloom filter data structure. This creates aggregate credentials c
(consisting of a single bit array of size m) that are sent with each data packet. This
process of creating credentials is illustrated in Figure 4.9.
When receiving a packet with aggregate credentials c, router j can then check
the value of all bits that were provided in router credentials rj . If the aggregate
credentials are valid, then ∏
i
c[rj [i]] = 1, (4.1)
where the product is the equivalent of a logical AND operation. If the aggregate
credentials do not contain the router credentials of a particular router, it is likely that
one of the bits in credentials c does not contain a 1 at one of the router credentials’ bit
positions. Thus the validation of the aggregate credentials fails. This argument, of
course, is of a probabilistic nature. A router may accept a packet that does not have
correct credentials with the same probability as a false positive appears in the Bloom
filter. However, packets are only successfully delivered to a destination if all routers
let them pass. Thus, a packet with invalid credentials would need to encounter a false
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Figure 4.9. Credentials Data Structure. This example shows three credentials that
are aggregated to a set of 1’s in the Bloom filter data structure.
positive on every router along the path. This probability decreases geometrically with
the number of hops in the path and thus is practically very small (see Section 4.4).
4.3.4 Credentials Security
The security of the network architecture depends on the security of the credentials.
That is, it should not be practically feasible to generate fake credentials for attack
traffic. In the context of Bloom filter credentials, it should therefore be difficult to
guess which bits are set by any given router. We can achieve this by using crypto-
graphically strong hash functions (e.g., SHA-1 [43]) where router j uses k secret keys
sj[i], 1 ≤ i ≤ k. The cryptographic hash function hi(sj[i], f) uses router j’s key for bit
index k to determine which bits to set in the aggregate credentials. It is important
that this function also uses flow identifier f (e.g., based on a 5-tuple hash) as an
input to avoid attacks where credentials from an authenticated connection are used
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by a different connection. If router credentials are used by a different connection, the
validation step (Equation 4.1) fails.
Credentials based on cryptographic hash functions and flow identifiers ensure the
following properties:
• Data path credentials for different flows are different (even if they traverse the
same set of routers) because the use of f as parameter in the hash function
creates different router credentials.
• Data path credentials for flows that traverse different routers are different, be-
cause a different set of router credentials (each depending on sj) are superim-
posed in the data path credentials.
• Data path credentials are difficult to fake since the result of the cryptographic
hash function hi cannot be guessed without availability of keys sj . Also, cre-
dentials cannot be reversed to obtain hash keys.
• While the generation of credentials is computationally expensive (n × k cryp-
tographic hash operations), credential check operations are simple. Credentials
can be checked by performing k lookups in credentials c to verify Equation 4.1.
Note that this requires that each router remembers the router credentials rj for
a particular flow. This is done by maintaining the credentials cache shown in
Figure 4.4. If the credentials for a flow cannot be found in this cache, the router
credentials can be recalculated (using sj and f) at a higher computational cost.
• Data path credentials are of small and constant size since all router credentials
rj can be superimposed into a single Bloom filter data structure.
With these key properties of data path credentials, it is possible to provide security
features on the network architecture level as discussed in Section 4.4.1. A more
detailed discussion on how security requirements are met is provided in Section 4.5.2.
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4.3.5 Density Limit
One important observation regarding credentials as described above is that there
exists a very simple attack to circumvent a credentials check: an attacker could set
all bits in the credentials to 1. Such credentials would always satisfy Equation 4.1,
no matter what secret keys or flow identifiers are used. This is clearly an undesirable
property.
In order to make data path credentials immune to this attack, we introduce one
additional concept to our Bloom filter. We define a “density” metric d(c) that reflects
the number of 1’s in credentials c as a fraction of the total size:
d(c) =
1
m
∑
i
c[i]. (4.2)
To consider credentials valid, we require that the density is equal or below a
certain threshold: d(c) ≤ dmax. If the density is higher, we assume the credentials to
be invalid and thus reject the packet. If the threshold is chosen to be too low, even
valid credentials may be rejected. In Section 4.4, we derive an equation that allows
us to estimate the expected number of set bits in the credentials data structure based
on the number of routers involved.
4.3.6 Group Credentials
As illustrated in Figure 4.10, providing credentials for groups of routers can reduce
the connection setup overhead. To implement such credentials, all routers in the
group simply share the same secret keys. Router credentials issued by any router in
the group sets the correct bits in the aggregate credentials to ensure that all other
routers in the group let the packet pass. If the end-system is not aware of the grouping
of routers, it negotiates router credentials with each router individually. Since the
router credentials from all routers in the group are the same, the resulting aggregate
credentials will have the same bits set.
72
    
	








  
fffiflflffi 
 ffi fifl !
 ffi fifl !
fiffffi fi ffi 
fifi fi"
ffiffi ffi


fifi
 fiffi# 
.
.
.
fffiflflffi 
$
%
&
'
(
)
*
+
$
%
&
'
(
)
,
ff"
...






-






.






/






0
ff"
ff"
  
ff"
ff"
ff"
fiffffi fi ffi 
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
ff"
ff"
ff"
ff"
ff"
Figure 4.10. Connection Setup using Group Credentials.
4.4 Security Analysis
The goal in this thesis is to develop a virtual network instance that is dominated
by strict security requirements. As explained above, we expect such networks to be
deployed in parallel to the existing Internet (either through virtualization or through
use of a dedicated infrastructure). Thus, we can design security requirements that
are necessary for such domain-specific networks, but would be infeasible or inefficient
in the conventional Internet.
4.4.1 Security Requirements
We consider the following security requirements:
• Prevention of unauthorized network access and traffic injection: Only autho-
rized users should be able to establish a connection in the network and send
traffic.
• Detection of packet header spoofing: An unauthorized user should not be able
to spoof packet headers to impersonate another entity.
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• Isolation of denial-of-service attacks: Sources of denial-of-service attacks should
be identifiable to isolate the attack.
• Intrusion prevention: Connections to end-systems should only be allowed on
explicitly specified ports (e.g., to avoid port-scans).
• Extrusion prevention: Connections from end-systems should be controllable to
deny extrusion attempts (i.e., security breaches where sensitive data is trans-
mitted from within a network).
In the context of these security requirements, our main focus is on authorization
and availability by ensuring that only packets that have been positively identified are
forwarded in the network. While this ties in closely with access control, confidentiality,
and integrity, we discuss how these latter issues are already addressed through the
use of existing key management and cryptographic solutions.
4.4.2 Attacker Capabilities
The capabilities of a potential attacker are assumed to be the following: (1) ability
to read any packet traversing an attacked router; (2) ability to modify any packet
traversing an attacked router; and (3) ability to send any packet from the attacked
router.
Additionally, we constrain the capabilities of the attacker as follows: (1) an at-
tacker does not have access to secret key material associated with an identity other
than themselves; (2) an attacker cannot drop all or a subset of network traffic on a
router (i.e., black holing); (3) an attacker’s access to links and nodes is limited such
that the network cannot be partitioned.
The limitations on the attacker’s capability are necessary to keep the discussion of
attack scenarios and security requirements within scope. Related work has addressed
techniques that can provide environments where such assumptions are reasonable. For
74
example, secure key generation and storage can be achieved with a cryptographic co-
processor [103] and black holing can be circumvented by using multi-path routing and
network coding [41]. The assumption that an attacker cannot partition the network
is necessary to ensure that some valid communication between nodes is possible.
With an understanding of the general concept of data path credentials and the
specific design of credentials based on Bloom filters, we evaluate the quantitative
security properties of this architecture. It is important to quantify these security
properties in order to evaluate specific system configurations. In this section, we
analyze the probabilistic guarantees that Bloom filters provide and present results in
the context of specific usage scenarios. We also discuss the design’s resilience against
DoS attacks and how security requirements are met.
4.4.3 Probability of Successful Attack
The main goal of our data path credentials architecture is to identify valid traffic
and thus not allow the transmission of attack traffic. Since a Bloom filter can yield
false positives, it is possible that traffic with forged credentials may pass through the
network. This false positive probability can be exploited by an attacker. Thus we
need to obtain a quantitative understanding on how likely this attack is for different
system configurations. This problem is related to the Generalized Birthday Problem
(GBP) [117], but differs in that the GBP only considers a single false positive. In the
case of data path credentials, we need false positives on every hop of the path for a
successful end-to-end attack.
The best attack from an attacker’s point of view is to send credentials with as
many bits set as possible. The more bits are set, the more likely the validation step
described in Equation 4.1 succeeds. The limit to the number of bits set in credentials
is given by the maximum density dmax. Since it is not possible to set all bits in the
credentials, the attacker needs to decide which ones to set. The credential system uses
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cryptographic hash functions, for which it is reasonable to assume that they generate
pseudo-random outputs. Thus, there is no structure that the attacker can exploit.
Thus, choosing a random set of bits for the attack credentials is as good a choice as
any other combination.
• Unicast:
In the unicast scenario, attack traffic needs to traverse n hops from source to
destination and pass credential checks on each hop. When validating credentials,
a router checks if all k bits of its credentials are set. To reach the destination,
all bits set (in valid credentials) are checked at least once. Thus, an attacker has
to be able to create forged credentials with at least those bits set. The number
of bits set, b(m, k, n), in a Bloom filter of size m with k hash functions and n
stored items is (as derived below):
b(m, k, n) = m ·
(
1−
(
1−
1
m
)kn)
. (4.3)
Here, we derive the estimated number of bits, b(m, k, n), that are set in a
Bloom filter of size m with k hash functions when n elements have been entered
(see Figure 4.9 for an illustration of the parameters). We first determine the
probabilities for 0’s and 1’s in the Bloom filter data structure. The probability
that a bit is not set by a single hash function depends on the size (i.e., m) of
the Bloom filter data structure:
P [bit not set by single hash function] = 1−
1
m
.
When using k hash functions, the probability that a bit is set by none of these
hash functions is
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P [bit not set by k hash functions] =
(
1−
1
m
)k
.
Note that for this analysis we assume that hash functions yield independent and
uniformly distributed hashes (as it is the case for cryptographic hash functions).
With n elements in the Bloom filter (i.e., n router credentials aggregated in
credentials c), a bit in c is not set with probability
P [bit not set by n elements] =
(
1−
1
m
)kn
.
Accordingly, the probability that a bit is set to 1 in the aggregate credentials
is:
P [bit set by n elements] = 1−
(
1−
1
m
)kn
.
This probability applies to all m bits in the Bloom filter. Thus, the expected
number of bits set to 1 in a Bloom filter of size m with k hash functions and n
elements is thus
b(m, k, n) = m ·
(
1−
(
1−
1
m
)kn)
,
which is the result used in Equation 4.3.
A false positive transmission (i.e., a successful attack) occurs when among the
bits set by the attacker (limited by dmax), there is the correct set of b(m, k, n)
bits that is checked by the set of routers along the path. The probability for
this event is:
funicast(m, k, n) = (dmax)
b(m,k,n) . (4.4)
The expected number of bits set in the credentials data structure also gives an
estimate on the longest path that can be supported by a particular configura-
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tion. If the expected number of bits set exceeds the density threshold, then even
valid credentials may be rejected (i.e., false negative). Valid configurations of
m, k, and n must meet
b(m, k, n) ≤ dmax. (4.5)
• Multicast:
In the multicast/multipath scenario, the source needs to aggregate router cre-
dentials from all routers along all paths to all destinations. For simplicity, we
assume that multicast is performed along a balanced and complete binary tree
where each node corresponds to a router that duplicates the packet and sends it
to two more nodes. The height of the tree, h, relates to the number of leaf nodes
(i.e., multicast destinations), l, as follows: 2h−1 < l ≤ 2h or h = ⌈log2 l⌉. The
number of internal nodes in such a tree corresponds to the number of routers n
that are encountered when multicasting: n = 2h − 1 or n = 2log2 l − 1 = l − 1.
Thus, 2h − 1 router credentials have to be aggregated in the Bloom filter and
the resulting number of bits set in the credentials is b(m, k, 2h − 1). This limits
the set of valid configurations to
b(m, k, 2h − 1) ≤ dmax. (4.6)
The exponential increase in the number of aggregated credentials requires a
much larger Bloom filter data structure. However, the size for this data struc-
ture grows less than exponential due to overlapping hash indices. To determine
the probability of false positive transmission of attack traffic we need to consider
all l = 2h = n+ 1 multicast paths. The false positive probability is then:
fmulticast(m, k, n) = 1− (1− funicast(m, k, h))
n+1 . (4.7)
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• Network Coding:
For network coding, the analysis is similar to that of multicast. Each connec-
tion starts sending aggregate credentials with 2h − 1 router credentials. When
generating a network coded packet, routers in the network aggregate credentials
from multiple connections. Thus, by the time a packet reaches its destination,
it may have gained credentials on every but the last hop along the path. (Note:
For simplicity, we assume that coding is done only across two packets at any
node.) Thus, there may be a total of n = (h− 1) · 2h − 1 credentials combined
in the packet. Thus, m and k need to be chosen suitably such that
b(m, k, (h− 1) · 2h − 1) ≤ dmax. (4.8)
To determine the false positive probability, we need to consider how many pack-
ets have to be received by a node such that the network coding can be reversed.
If we code packets on each of h − 1 hops, then 2h−1 packets need to be re-
ceived by the receiver for successful decoding. This corresponds to successfully
achieving h − 1 false positive (h − 1)-hop multicast transmissions and a 1-hop
unicast transmission. (Due to the structure of network coding, one hop along
the path cannot be multicast.) Since a tree of height h− 1 has n+1
2
nodes, the
false positive probability is then:
fnetwork coding(m, k, n) = (
fmulticast(m, k,
n + 1
2
) · funicast(m, k, 1)
)n+1
2
. (4.9)
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Figure 4.11. Bits Set in Aggregate Credentials.
4.5 Security Performance Evaluation
To illustrate the equations derived in the previous section in the context of a
realistic system configuration, we provide security performance results of a few specific
system configurations.
Figure 4.11 shows the number of bits set (as determined by b(m, k, n)) for cre-
dentials of size 128 bits and four hash functions. As the path length increases, the
number of bits set by credentials also increases. For multicast and network coding, the
increase is much steeper than for unicast since many more credentials are aggregated
due to the larger number of paths and destinations. When the maximum density (in
this example dmax = 0.75) is exceeded, credentials are rejected by all routers. Thus,
credentials of a particular size should only be used in network configurations where
the number of set bits is expected to be below dmax. For our example, unicast can
support 44 hops, multicast can support 5 hops (32 destinations), and network coding
can support 3 hops (8 destinations). It is important to note that this is a very con-
servative estimate for multicast and network coding as we assume a complete binary
tree. In a real system, the number of destination nodes for a given path length is
expected to be lower and thus longer paths can be supported.
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Figure 4.12. Probability of Successful Attack Transmission.
The false positive rates that correspond to this example are shown in Figure 4.12.
Data points are only shown for those cases where the maximum density is not ex-
ceeded (the dotted lines continue beyond this limit to illustrate the overall trends).
The decreasing trend with an increasing number of hops is due to repeated credential
checks. The more routers are traversed, the less likely it becomes that random at-
tack credential are validated repeatedly as false positives. The false positive rate for
unicast decreases more quickly than that of multicast. Multicast has more source-to-
destination paths and thus more opportunities to create a false positive transmission.
For network coding, the opposite happens. Since coded packets can only be decoded
when other coded packets are received, the probability of false positives drops even
faster than with unicast.
Clearly, the maximum path length and the false positive probability depend on the
choice of dmax. Figure 4.13 shows the trend of the maximum path length for unicast,
which increases as expected with increasing values of dmax. The probability of false
positive transmission of attack traffic shows a clear minimum around dmax = 0.4. For
lower values of dmax, the overall path length is so short that high false positives may
occur (as shown in Figure 4.12). For larger values of dmax, a large number of bits may
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Figure 4.13. Maximum Path Length and Probability of Successful Attack for Dif-
ferent Density Limits in Unicast.
be set in credentials, which also leads to higher false positive rates. For multicast
and network coding, similar trends can be observed (not shown). For a practical
implementation, a balance between longer paths and less attack vulnerability needs
to be found that is suitable for all types of connections.
The capabilities of different configurations for m and k are shown Tables 4.1
and 4.2. The maximum path length (assuming dmax = 0.75) is shown in Table 4.1.
The probability of a false positive end-to-end transmission with randomly generated
credentials is shown in Table 4.2. In general, a smaller number of hash functions
works well as it does not cause the Bloom filter to fill up as quickly. However, fewer
hash functions also mean that fewer bits are checked on each router. This effect can
be seen in the multicast case where high attack success probabilities appear for k = 2.
Overall, the results show that data path credentials can detect attack traffic within
a small number of hops, even when a large number of paths are involved (e.g., in the
multicast scenario). The overhead for implementing such capabilities depends on the
chosen size of the credentials, but could be practically as small as 64 bits for unicast
over up to 20 hops.
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Table 4.1. Maximum Path Length for Different Configurations of Credentials Size
(n) and Number of Hash Functions (k).
n
k unicast multicast network coding
32 64 128 256 32 64 128 256 32 64 128 256
2 21 44 88 177 4 5 6 7 3 3 4 5
4 10 22 44 88 3 4 5 6 2 3 3 4
8 5 11 22 44 2 3 4 5 2 2 3 3
16 2 5 11 22 1 2 3 4 1 2 2 3
Table 4.2. Attack Success Probability for Different Configurations of Credentials
Size (n) and Number of Hash Functions (k).
n
k unicast multicast network coding
32 64 128 256 32 64 128 256 32 64 128 256
2 .001 .000 .000 .000 .662 .507 .361 .243 .043 .040 .004 .000
4 .001 .000 .000 .000 .284 .125 .047 .016 .034 .000 .000 .000
8 .001 .000 .000 .000 .098 .018 .002 .000 .001 .001 .000 .000
16 .003 .000 .000 .000 .050 .003 .000 .000 1.00 .000 .000 .000
4.5.1 Denial of Service Attacks
One important issue to consider in the context of capability-based networking is
the susceptibility of the system to denial of service attacks. Argyraki and Cheriton
have argued that capabilities simply shift vulnerabilities from the data path to the
control path [10]. In systems where no data path checks are performed as part of
the control setup, this problem indeed exists. In our architecture, however, it is
possible to contain DoS attacks such that they do not affect the entire network. We
require that control traffic also obtain credentials for setting up capabilities further
down the path (as shown in Figure 4.5). If a malicious node tries to attack the
control infrastructure, it is limited to attacking only immediate neighbors. Since
these systems do not issue suitable credentials without proper authentication (which
is usually not the case in DoS attacks – otherwise independent service limitation
and policing can be employed), the attacker cannot reach other routers farther away.
Thus, the DoS attack is contained to immediately surrounding nodes and decreases
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geometrically in strength as the probability of multiple false positive credential checks
decreases along the path. This difference in design is an important aspect for a
practical deployment and successful use of data path credentials.
Beyond brute force denial of service attacks, more complex attacks based on low
bandwidth, well-timed traffic injections have been proposed [65]. These types of
attacks are generally difficult to detect in any network. In our architecture, these
attacks can be avoided if they are launched from a non-authorized end-system (as
this traffic gets dropped due to failed credentials checks). If the attack is launched
by an authorized end-system, there is no apparent defense other than through access
control.
4.5.2 Validation of Security Requirements
With an understanding of the qualitative and quantitative security properties
provided by the credential-based data path architecture, we can revisit the security
requirements stated in Section 4.4.1. Using credentials, a router can audit every
packet in the data path and validate that it indeed is eligible to be forwarded. Cre-
dentials identify a packet in terms of its source and destination (e.g., machine, user)
and its path (i.e., set of all credentials). The connection setup process can be used to
enforce policies (e.g., access control) in order to control what network communication
is permitted. With a suitable choice of credentials size and maximum path length,
the probability of a successful attack due to false positives in the Bloom filter can be
kept diminishingly small.
Thus, data path credentials can be effectively used to meet the stated security
requirements:
• Prevention of unauthorized network access: All end-systems need to identify
themselves properly to all routers along the path, where access permissions can
be validated. If an end-system does not properly identify itself or does not have
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the appropriate permissions, no suitable credentials are issued. Thus, packets
sent by such an end-system are dropped at or close to the first router.
• Detection of packet header spoofing: Credentials are issued based on the end-
system identity. If packet headers (i.e., source addresses) are spoofed, then a
router looks up the wrong set of credentials (due to a different flow identifier)
and drops the spoofed packet. This happens for any spoofing of header fields
used in the flow classification process.
• Partial prevention of traffic injection: Based on prevention of unauthorized
access and header spoofing, it is not possible for an attacker to inject traffic
from any node that is not along the path of an existing connection. However,
it is possible to inject traffic if a node along the path is compromised since the
credentials used in a connection are visible and thus can be copied for the attack
traffic. The impact of this type of traffic injection can be mitigated through the
use of end-system security protocols that require end-system keys to correctly
encrypt packet payloads.
• Isolation of denial-of-service attacks: One of the main benefits of data path
credentials is the ability to limit the impact of denial of service attacks. The
use of credentials ensures that either the source of traffic can be identified (since
correct credentials have been issued) or attack traffic can be isolated (since
packets without correct credentials are dropped at or close to the first hop).
• Partial intrusion prevention: Data path credentials can be extended to not only
include routers but also the receiving end-system. The system can limit, for
example, to which port traffic can be sent. Thus, data path credentials act
comparably to a firewall. This approach, however, does not protect against
intrusion on a port that is “open” on the end-system.
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• Partial extrusion prevention: In order to prevent an end-system from transmit-
ting data to particular destinations, routers along the path can be configured to
deny this communication (i.e., to not issue credentials when requested). This
approach, however, does not prevent extrusion via relay nodes.
In addition, data path credentials can be used in conjunction with conventional
security and cryptographic protocols (e.g., IPSec, SSL) to further improve network
security.
4.6 Protocol Implementation
We have designed and prototyped a protocol that implements the functionality
of data path credentials as discussed above. This Data Path Credentials Protocol
(DPCP) is located between the network layer and the transport layer of the Internet
protocol stack. In principle, it is possible to integrate data path credentials with a
new network layer protocol. However, we do not consider the redesign of the Internet
Protocol in this work. Instead, we leverage the functionality of the existing IP protocol
and add DPCP on top of it.
4.6.1 Data Path Credentials Protocol
The header for DPCP is shown in Figure 4.14. The overall header is 28 bytes in
size and is based on a Bloom filter configuration of m = 128 and k = 4. The fields in
the header are used as follows:
• Port numbers: The first 32 bits are port numbers identical to how they are used
in TCP and UDP. These fields are mere copies of the values that are carried in
the layer 4 header of the packet (which is assumed to be either TCP or UDP
to allow for packet classification). It can be debated if it is a “cleaner” design
to copy these values or to let DPCP read the layer 4 protocol header. If the
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compactness of the header is important, these fields could be omitted in an
optimized implementation.
• Next protocol: This 8-bit field indicates the layer 4 protocol header in the
packet. This field is identical to the next protocol field in the IP header. (For
our implementation, the IP header indicates 253 for DPCP, which is reserved
for experimental protocols.)
• Flags: The flags are used in our protocol implementation to indicate packet
types used during connection setup. The types used are the following:
– Setup flag (S): Indicates a packet containing a setup request.
– Challenge flag (C): Indicates a packet containing a challenge to an end-
system.
– Response flag (R): Indicates a packet containing a response to a challenge.
– Credentials flag (I): Indicates a packet containing Bloom filter indices.
• Setup field: This field can be used in different ways for establishing connections.
The use is identified by the flags.
– Challenge nonce (32 bits): This nonce is used by the router to challenge
the end-system.
– Response (32 bits): The end-system sends this encrypted nonce to prove
its identity.
– Bloom filter indices (28 bits): These four indices (each with a size of
logm = log 128 = 7 bits) indicate the bits that are set by a router as
its credential in the Bloom filter.
• Data path credentials: This 128-bit field is the Bloom filter that carries all
router credentials.
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challenge nonce (32 bits) / response (32bits) / 
Bloom filter indices (28 bits)
source port (16 bits) destination port (16 bits)
next protocol 
(8 bits)
flags 
(8 bits)
unused
data path credentials (128 bits)
IP header
TCP/UDP header
Figure 4.14. Data Path Credentials Protocol Header.
Note that the Bloom filter indices are separate from the Bloom filter itself. The
reason for this design is that during connection setup, the Bloom filter is used to
permit communication to and from the router from which credentials need to be
obtained. The credential itself is carried in the Bloom filter indices. Since these
indices are not used after connection setup, an optimized implementation may use
two different header formats for setup and data transfer.
4.6.2 Router Processing
When DPCP packets arrive on a router, it needs to be distinguished if they belong
to a connection setup request to this router or if they should be forwarded. Note
that a router needs to forward connection requests that are directed at other routers
along the path. To make this distinction, the router simply checks if the data path
credentials carried in the packet are valid (see Figure 4.15). If they are, then there is
no need to further consider the packet locally. (Note that this is also true in case the
credentials of previous routers in the path accidentally cause a false positive in the
Bloom filter.) In case of a setup packet, the appropriate challenge is sent to the end-
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Figure 4.15. Decision Diagram for DPCP Processing on Router.
system. In case of a response, it is verified and the Bloom filter indices are returned
to the sender. In all other cases, the packet is dropped.
4.6.3 Bidirectional Verification
One important practical consideration is that most communication in the Internet
is bidirectional. Even in the setup phase, the challenge and credential packets need
to reach the sender. To avoid that routers have to set up (and store) credentials for
this return path, we set up the system to use the same data path credentials for both
directions of traffic. (Note that we assume symmetric routes.) Thus, the challenge
and credential packets simply carry the same data path credentials that were carried
in the original packet.
To implement this type of bidirectional verification, it is necessary to modify
the flow identification process. In our system, the classification result of a 5-tuple
of a connection in one direction should match that of a connection in the opposite
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Figure 4.16. Experimental Emulab Setup for Evaluation of DPCP.
direction. We achieve this by sorting the IP addresses and port numbers before
providing them to the classifier. Thus, when the IP addresses and port numbers are
swapped on the return path, the sorting ensures that the classification result is still
the same.
4.7 Evaluation of Emulab Implementation
We have implemented the DPCP protocol on Emulab [119]. We modified the
Linux kernel (version 2.6.21.4) of Emulab end-systems and routers to implement the
DPCP protocol operations. In our implementation we set the credential size to 128
bits (m=128) and the density threshold to dmax = 0.3125 (which corresponds to 40 out
of 128 bits). For challenge/response authentication, every node was set up with a key
pair and public-key/private-key cryptographic operation were performed using 1024-
bit RSA-based encryption. To determine the Bloom filter indices for credentials for a
flow, routers performed four SHA-1 hash functions (i.e., k=4). For our experiments,
we used the simple 10-hop topology shown in Figure 4.16. Each link has a bandwidth
of 100 Mbps and a one-way delay of 10ms.
4.7.1 Attack Containment
The most important result from our prototype implementation is that DPCP
successfully contains attack traffic. Figure 4.17 shows the amount of traffic that passes
each hop with an attacker sending traffic with random credentials (with the highest
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Figure 4.17. Containment of Attack traffic with DPCP.
permissible density of dmax). Since the attacker does not know which credentials
are acceptable, only packets that have the correct bits set in the Bloom filter by
coincidence are forwarded. The attack source sends at a high rate of approximately
40,550 packets per second. The first hop only forwards on average 372 packets per
second (0.92% of the attackers traffic). This traffic is further reduced at the next hop
(1.3 packets per second or 0.003% of original attack traffic), etc. During the 10-hour
experiment to generate these data, only a single packet out of 1.46 billion made it
past the fourth hop.
This result shows that the proposed protocol is highly effective in containing
unauthorized traffic. The vast majority of all attack traffic (99.08%) is contained
within a single hop of the attack source. Practically no traffic reaches any node that
is 5 hops or more away from the attacker.
One key question is what impact this 1-hop containment has on other traffic in the
network compared to existing credentials-based systems. Therefore, we consider the
throughput performance of TCP cross-traffic as shown in Figure 4.18. We compare
two different system configurations:
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 Figure 4.18. Experimental Emulab Setup for Evaluation of Cross-Traffic Perfor-
mance.
• Existing credential-based network (“conventional”): In this setup, Node 9 per-
forms credential checks and removes all attack traffic. This configuration cor-
responds to credential-based networks that only verify traffic at some nodes in
the network.
• Data path credentials with 1-hop containment (“DPCP”): In this setup, cre-
dentials are verified with DPCP at every node in the network.
We assume Node 1 is the source of attack traffic that is destined to the receiver.
The TCP throughput performance of cross-traffic on each link is shown in Table 4.3.
In the conventional credential-based network, attack traffic affects the throughput
performance of benign traffic all the way to the point where the credential check is
performed. In our experiment, all connections on links between Node 1 and Node
9 drop 1–4% of their baseline performance. In contrast, DPCP can filter most traf-
fic within the first hop and only traffic on the link between Node 1 and Node 2 is
significantly affected. Even on the link between node 2 and Node 3, 95% of base-
line performance can be achieved. For links farther away from the attack, 99–100%
of baseline performance is achieved. These results show very clearly the ability of
our system to protect the network infrastructure from DoS attacks, in addition to
protecting end-systems.
92
Table 4.3. Comparison of Cross-Traffic Performance for Conventional and DPCP
Credential-Based Networks.
.
Cross-traffic Baseline Conventional DPCP
link Mbps Mbps % of basel. Mbps % of basel.
1–2 78.2 1.07 1% 1.04 1%
2–3 79.1 1.15 1% 74.9 95%
3–4 78.8 1.75 2% 77.9 99%
4–5 77.2 1.95 3% 76.5 99%
5–6 79.4 2.60 3% 79.1 100%
6–7 74.0 2.86 4% 73.4 99%
7–8 72.9 2.83 4% 72.6 100%
8–9 72.8 2.86 4% 71.8 99%
9–10 71.2 70.0 98% 71.5 100%
4.7.2 Connection Setup Overhead
Clearly, there are additional costs in using DPCP over conventional TCP. In Fig-
ure 4.19, we show the breakdown of the setup time for a single hop. The total time for
verification of identities and the generation of credentials takes 11.5 ms in addition
to the communication delay. As discussed in Section 4.2, such a setup is required
for each hop along the path of a connection. Figure 4.20 shows the time required
for a complete connection setup over different numbers of hops. This cryptographic
processing delay grows linearly with the number of hops and is unavoidable in any
protocol that verifies identities on every hop of the path. The communication delay
grows quadratically as challenge and response messages have to traverse an increasing
number of hops.
While the non-linear growth of connection setup time is clearly undesirable, it is
important to note that it is necessary to ensure 1-hop containment and protection
from denial-of-capabilities attacks. Also, this setup cost is only a one-time cost for a
connection; it can be amortized over the lifetime of a longer connection and still lead
to good throughput performance as can be seen in the next results.
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Figure 4.19. Breakdown of Connection Setup Time for Single Hop.
4.7.3 Throughput Comparison
The overall performance comparison of DPCP vs. conventional TCP is shown in
Table 4.4. The table lists the completion times for file transfers of different length.
Clearly, short file transfers are dominated by the setup cost in DPCP and thus lead to
significantly lower performance. However, longer file transfers are only slower by 6%.
This reduction in throughput is due to the additional computation that each router
performs when verifying credentials. Clearly, such a small overhead is outweighed by
the benefits of 1-hop containment shown above.
4.7.4 Flow Rate Performance
A key concern is the rate at which new connections can be established. The main
limitation in the data plane is the speed at which cryptographic operations in the
connection setup can be performed. In the control plane, there is a limitation due
to policy-related computations (i.e., relating identities used in the connection setup
with policy rules). We assume that the latter can be precomputed (and recomputed
when updates happen) and thus can be performed efficiently.
To demonstrate the rate at which the cryptographic computations necessary in the
data plane can be performed, we show Table 4.5. The table shows the achievable flow
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Figure 4.20. Time for Connection Setup in DPCP.
rate performance in a router for different types of processor systems. We have sepa-
rated the response verification step and the credentials generation step since response
verification only occurs once per connection. Credentials verification occurs at least
once, depending on how effectively the credentials can be cached. It can be seen that
the response verification, which consists of an RSA decryption operation, dominates
the processing overhead for connection setup. With conventional processor hardware,
multiple tens of thousands of connection setups per second can be supported. Using
specialized hardware, such as a graphics processing unit, hundreds of thousands of
connection setups per second can be achieved [60]. These rates are sufficient even for
core network traffic (and they are expected to continue to increase with future gen-
erations of processors). The credentials generation step, which corresponds to SHA-1
computations, can be performed multiple hundreds of thousand times per second and
thus does not pose a bottleneck.
The memory that needs to be maintained on a router (i.e., in the credentials cache
shown in Figure 4.4) depends on the number of active flows in a system. Each flow
record requires 17 bytes of data for a 5-tuple flow identifier and credential indices
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Table 4.4. File Transfer Performance.
File transfer time
File size TCP DPCP Overhead
10B 0.71s 2.35s 3.30×
100B 0.71s 2.35s 3.30×
1kB 0.72s 2.37s 3.29×
10kB 1.34s 3.22s 2.40×
100kB 2.65s 4.28s 1.61×
1MB 7.91s 10.2s 1.28×
10MB 16.1s 19.4s 1.20×
100MB 48.3s 53.9s 1.11×
1GB 495s 525s 1.06×
Table 4.5. Flow Setup Performance. Response verification and credentials genera-
tion per second
Response verification Credentials generation
Processor 512-bits 1024-bits
Intel Xeon 7,491 2,250 351,049
AMD Dual Core 1210 18,582 7,160 461,874
Intel Core 2 Duo 34,780 11,097 660,019
Intel Pentium 4 61,967 17,859 842,909
(assuming k = 4). Figure 4.21 shows the effect of the credentials cache size on the
maximum packet processing rate that can be achieved in the system. The results in
the figure assume 100,000 active flows. The results are based on a system that can
compute 842,909 credentials per second in case of a cache miss (from Table 4.5) or
look up 10 million credentials per second in its cache in case of a hit. The three lines
show the results for different percentages of new flows. A new flow percentage of
100% corresponds to a denial of capabilities attack, where no cache hit is achieved.
The figure shows several important results:
• Even without a cache (i.e., size of zero), the system can handle over 800,000
packets per second. In this case, all credentials are verified by computing the
indices from scratch.
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Figure 4.21. Packet Processing Rate for Different Credential Cache Sizes. Total
number of active flows is 100,000. Maximum credential lookup rate is 10 million per
second.
• Even for a cache attack, where all packets belong to new flows, the system can
handle over 800,000 packets per second.
• For cache sizes over 1MB, the system can handle multiple million packets per
second. Most verifications can be achieved by lookup and some are done by
computation (depending on the percentage of new flows).
Thus, these results show that credential cache memory size can be traded off
for computation. More computations are necessary and the throughput degrades
when cache hits are smaller (due to small cache size or many new flows), but the
system continues to function. In contrast, larger cache sizes can increase the system
throughput to the limit that can be achieved by the credentials lookup mechanism.
A system with a hundred thousand active flows requires less than two Megabytes of
memory to operate in this regime. With current technology, this memory requirement
is feasible to implement in a practical system.
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4.8 Related Work
Capabilities-based networks, which are one example of specialized networks that
focus on security, have been discussed by Anderson et al. [9], Yaar et al. [128], and
Yang et al. [130] in the context of DoS attacks. Previously, similar ideas have been
proposed by Estrin et al. [48] for controlling packet flows in networks. A system
design to avoid denial of service attacks based on the idea of capabilities from [9]
has been proposed by Yang et al. [130] where capabilities are used to authorize and
verify traffic. In capabilities-based networks, traffic needs to be authorized before
it is transmitted, thus providing more control than in the current Internet, where
all traffic is allowed by default. In previously proposed capabilities-based networks,
capabilities are validated by one or a small number of nodes along the path. In our
design, every node validates packets to ensure 1-hop containment of malicious traffic.
Early detection and elimination of attack traffic is important to limit its effects on
valid traffic that shares the same networking resources. This 1-hop containment is
important in conventional networks, but even more so in networks with limited band-
width resources, such as mobile ad-hoc networks (MANET) [6]. In our architecture,
we can identify and squelch most malicious traffic within one hop from its source and
thus avoid the consumption of network resources as this traffic is forwarded to its
target.
Another capabilities-based system, SIFF [128], classifies network traffic into priv-
ileged and unprivileged traffic, where the legitimate (privileged) traffic establishes
connection using a capability exchange handshake. However, the length of the capa-
bilities carried in the legitimate network traffic is not constant, which is inconvenient
in network protocols. Also the computational overhead for the verification step on
the router is high since it requires the computation of a keyed hash function (which is
equivalent to the worst-case performance of our system as discussed in Section 4.7.4).
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In addition, the security achieved by SIFF is lower than in our system since the
capability bits used by each router are much fewer than in our system.
There also exist other variations of network systems that aim to squelch attack
traffic. A router-based approach to DoS protection is proposed by Huici and Handley
[59], where IP encapsulation is used to tunnel traffic between edge networks. DoS
floods can be identified and squelched at the decapsulation point using access control
mechanisms. Similarly, Ballani et al. [15] have proposed the use of access control rules
to allow individual end-systems to inform the network about which traffic they want
(or do not want) to receive. A network architecture to limit LAN traffic is Ethane
proposed by Casado et al. [30]. Ethane provides fine-grained network access control
for enterprise networks. Access is controlled by per-flow entries in the forwarding
table of an edge switch. This design works well for the enterprise scenario, but falls
short if access permissions are issued by an entity that does not have direct control
over the forwarding table of a switch. Our architecture provides a separation between
entities that issue credentials and those that enforce them. Ethane also addresses the
general issue of policies and access permissions. In our work, we assume a suitable
policy controller to be in place and focus on the issue of how to enforce access control
in the data path (see Section 4.2.4).
It has been pointed out that capabilities systems are susceptible to denial of
capabilities (DoC) attacks, i.e., denial of service attacks on the capability-granting
subsystem [10]. Recently, Parno et al. developed a solution to DoC attacks by using
proof-of-work to limit an attacker’s capability requests [84]. While our approach
is conceptually similar to previous off-by-default architectures, we introduce several
novel ideas to make this general idea a practical reality. We consider computationally
efficient credentials and show how they can be applied to unicast, multicast, and
network coding scenarios. In Section 4.5.1, we show that in our architecture DoC
attacks can be isolated to affect only routers close to the source of attack and thus
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limit the impact on the overall network. A complex proof-of-work scheme is not
required since the DoC defense is inherently part of the network design.
Packet marking has been proposed as an alternate mechanism to provide defenses
against DoS attacks by tracing back the path of malicious traffic. The marking process
can be probabilistic [97] or deterministic [18]. Packet marking allows the identification
of a traffic source even if an attacker spoofs protocol addresses. Traceback can also be
achieved by extending routers to maintain records of packets that have been forwarded
[104]. These audit trails can be examined to determine the source of a packet. Once
malicious sources have been identified, they can be actively filtered as proposed in [11].
The process of packet marking, traffic analysis, and explicit blocking is reactive rather
than proactive as in the case of capabilities-based networks.
The data path credentials that we propose in this work are based on Bloom filters.
Bloom filters were introduced by Burton Bloom in 1970 [24] and found a number of
applications in network systems [27,47]. We adapt Bloom filters for the use with what
we call credentials. These credentials are derived from cryptographic hash functions
such as SHA-1 [43]. The use of hash functions for packet authentication has been
proposed by Tsudik in [108], but not in the context of Bloom filters, which require
less storage space. We further expand the credentials data structure to consider the
density of set bits in the Bloom filter (i.e., the fill level). Scalable Bloom filters
have been proposed to circumvent the fill level problem [7], but are not applicable
in our work as we need fixed-length credentials to limit packet header sizes. The
concept of router virtualization [8] has made it conceivable to deploy domain-specific
network architectures in parallel to the existing best-effort Internet. Currently, several
specific systems [17, 109] are being developed that could support the types of data
path operations we propose in this chapter.
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4.9 Summary
In this chapter, a capabilities-based network protocol was presented that uses data
path credentials to closely control traffic on every hop. The credentials were based
on Bloom filter data structures can efficiently implement capabilities and can provide
probabilistic guarantees on permitting only valid traffic to traverse the network. A
detailed security analysis that allows a quantitative evaluation of the capabilities
of the system for unicast, multicast, and network coding uses was provided. The
results show that adding credentials with as few as 64 bits to packets can reduce the
probability that attack traffic can reach its destination to a fraction of a percent. In
addition, results from a practical implementation of the protocol on Emulab show
that less than one percent of attack traffic passes the first hop and the performance
overhead can be as low as 6% for large file transfers.
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CHAPTER 5
SUMMARY AND FUTURE WORK
In this dissertation, security issues in network virtualization were explored, which
points toward an interesting and important new area in network security. In partic-
ular, we systematically discuss the relationship between all entities and explore what
potential attacks can be launched between each pair of participating entities. In this
context, we discuss security requirements and attacker capabilities that underly each
network entity. This work presents several ideas and two practical solutions to solve
privacy, confidentiality, authorization, and availability of hosted virtual networks.
5.1 Summary
To summarize, the following defense mechanisms were proposed that contribute
to the goal of secure network virtualization in the future Internet:
• EncrIP: To address the privacy and confidentiality issue, EncrIP, an IP ad-
dress encryption scheme was presented. The technique uses prefix-preserving
encryption and probabilistic encryption to hide address information while still
allowing forwarding using unmodified IP headers and commodity routers. A
detailed description on the security implication and performance overhead was
quantified to show the effectiveness of the EncrIP technique. Our evaluation
shows that gateways require only a few MB of memory to implement EncrIP
and that in practice the probability of correctly identifying two packets belong-
ing to the same flow is less than 0.001%. The implementation results confirm
that the proposed technique introduces low latency and space overhead and is
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effective against statistical inference attacks. In summary, EncrIP provides a
practical solution to privacy in virtualized networks.
• DPCP: Next, to guarantee inherent security features that support 1-hop con-
tainment of network attacks, DPCP, a capabilities-based virtual network in-
stance was presented that uses high-performance data path credentials. Cre-
dentials based on Bloom filter data structure was presented that can efficiently
implement the required capabilities and can provide probabilistic guarantees
on permitting only valid traffic to traverse the network. A detailed security
analysis that allows a quantitative evaluation of the capabilities of the system
for unicast, multicast, and network coding was discussed. The experimental
evaluation shows that, less than one percent of attack traffic passes the first
hop and the performance overhead can be as low as 6% for large file transfers.
Since router system can be easily extended to generate and validate credentials
in the data path, we believe this design provides a practical solution to provide
inherent security capabilities in the network virtualization architecture.
5.2 Future Work: Packet Forwarding Misbehavior Detection
One possible research direction that can be considered for the future work is
discussed here. The network entities are subjected to both external and internal
attacks and hence it is in the interest of all participating entities to consider the
problem of accountability (e.g., violations, anomalies, tampering of resources etc) in
the network virtualization architecture. One instance is when the NI components
perform the packet forwarding functionality on-behalf of the hosted virtual network.
Here, network traffic is forwarded by router components that belong to different
administrative entities. In such a scenario, it is important for the VN to identify if
the NI components are performing the packet forwarding as specified.
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To address the above challenge, we discuss a forwarding misbehavior detection
system that identifies if third-party NI components deviate from the expected for-
warding behavior. Any malicious or compromised router can drop packets (i.e., black
hole attack) or fraction of packets (i.e., gray hole attack) by injecting additive ma-
licious losses, thereby compromising the forwarding behavior. Also, it is important
to differentiate between malicious packet loss behavior and congestion-based network
conditions. In addition, the technique should ensure that the proposed mechanism has
high positive detection rates with effective accuracy and low performance overhead.
5.2.1 Challenges
The following technical challenges should be addressed by the proposed system:
Are network infrastructure components exhibiting packet forwarding misbehaviors?
How can the system verify or monitor the compromised entity with low false posi-
tives (high accuracy)? Does the monitoring mechanism introduce a detection or a
prevention scheme in identifying the compromised network entity? Can the mon-
itoring mechanism introduce a verification module that can guarantee the privacy
of the VN and NI components? How can the user identify both the control and
data plane performance of the network? What are the financial constraints for such
identifications?
5.2.2 Related Work
Current compromised router identification mechanisms either involve distributed
monitoring approach or propose an ack-based adversary identification technique. A
monitoring mechanism that uses conservation of flow principle was introduced in [26].
A failure detector mechanism that uses a combination of source routing, authentica-
tion and reliability mechanisms to identify the compromised router component was
introduced in [14]. Similarly, [81] uses traffic validation schemes between the source
and the intermediate routers to detect faulty or compromised routers. One concern
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with these distributed monitoring schemes is that the technique incurs significant
communication and storage overhead in determining the compromised node.
To optimize performance overhead, trajectory sampling [42] technique for traf-
fic measurements was extended for the malicious router detection problem by [67].
Similarly, “Network confessional” [13] verifies the forwarding performance of network
entities using delayed sampling technique. To localize the identification of the com-
promised entity, a fault localization protocol with lower performance overhead was
introduced by [16] and a packet-dropping adversary identification mechanism was
proposed in [134]. To identify incorrect packet forwarding behavior, [73] subdivides
the problem into traffic characterization and violation detection and takes counter-
measure to isolate the compromised component.
While current malicious router detection techniques either focus on optimizing the
performance overhead or the detection accuracy, in virtualized networks we require a
technique with high detection accuracy, low performance overhead, and localization
of the packet-forwarding adversary. To provide such a technique, we introduce a
controller-based detection system that can be effective in the network virtualization
architecture.
5.2.3 Security Model
We begin our discussion with the security model, explaining the requirements and
attacker capabilities in the system. The following set of security requirements ensure
the secure processing of network traffic by routers: 1) NI components should forward
packets as specified by the VN provider, 2) VN entity should be able to identify the
NI entities that introduce malicious packet forwarding behavior, and 3) Malicious
traffic originating from the compromised node should be inferred and discarded.
The possible attacker capabilities that can be launched from a compromised NI
component are assumed to be the following: 1) The attacker can selectively drop
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legitimate network traffic, which introduces malicious packet loss behavior by ex-
ploiting the congestion control mechanism, 2) Arbitrary network traffic (data and
control packets) can be injected from the compromised router, 3) Data packets can
be modified to introduce anomalous forwarding and routing behavior, and 4) To hide
the adversarial performance, false or compromised proof can be generated for the
verification process. Based on the above security model, it is important to design a
verification mechanism that ensures the avoidance of such attacks with the following
properties:
• Detection Accuracy: The fundamental challenge in developing a forwarding
misbehavior detection technique is to provide an accurate detection mechanism
with low false positive (identifying congestion-based packet loss as malicious
packet drop) and false negative (incorrectly disregarding a malicious packet
loss as congestion-based packet loss) detection rates.
• Performance Overhead: Another important challenge is to provide a technique
that is effective with respect to the communication overhead required to detect a
malicious forwarding behavior (packet loss) and the storage overhead introduces
in the system.
• Localization: Also, since a virtual network is hosted on multiple network infras-
tructure entities, it is important to localize the identification of the compromised
component and avoid unjust blaming of NI entities.
5.2.4 Controller-based Detection System
To address the above challenges, a controller-based misbehavior detection system
can be introduced as shown in Figure 5.1. The technique of using witness-based for-
warding misbehavior detection in wireless networks was shown in [129]. Unlike the
witness-based model, which chooses the witness nodes from the set of observing neigh-
bor nodes, we require a secure VN-based controller entity that monitors the packet
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Figure 5.1. Forwarding Misbehavior Detection System
forwarding functionality of the hosted NI components. The system consists of a VN
controller node (C), that evaluates the forwarding performance of the NI components
between end systems. Particularly, the detection process should include the following
steps: 1) Detection Setup, 2) Forwarding Proof Collection, and 3) Controller-based
verification.
Detection Setup: Here we discuss an instance of how the detection setup con-
nection is first established. At a particular time t, the controller C dynamically
monitors nodes belonging to a single network infrastructure to verify the packet for-
warding behavior. At this instance, the controller initiates the verification process at
the output node of upstream NI and the input node of the downstream NI. To avoid
excessive communication and storage overhead, rather than collecting the forwarding
behavior information from each router in the forwarding path, the VN can perform
the detection mechanism at the input and output border routers of each NI in the
path. With this setup, If the output router belonging to a particular NI exhibits
significant loss, the VN can raise a misbehavior detection alarm to the NI entity and
hold the NI responsible for the irregularities emanating from its administrated router
components.
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For example, in figure 5.1 at a given instance of time, the VN controller C de-
cides to monitor set of routers belonging to Q. In order to evaluate the forwarding
performance of Q, the controller initiates the verification process by gathering the
forwarding proofs sent to the input of Q from P and the forwarding proofs from the
output of Q to R.
Forwarding Proof Collection: Verifying the data path performance of the NI
components require collecting information about the packet forwarding performance.
When the verification process is initiated by C, the forwarding proof (sample ag-
gregate) data are collected from Q and evidence aggregates are collected from its
neighboring NIs (P and R) to verify the forwarding behavior. To avoid preferential
treatment to sample packets (i.e., the node decides to forward sample packets cor-
rectly and drop packets that are not considered in the sample set), the proof collection
mechanism should use a hash-based delay sampling technique. The technique ensures
that an adversarial node does not know a-priori if a packet is required for verification
analysis and hence preferential treatment to sampled packets can be avoided.
To ensure that all three routers sample the same forwarding proof information,
it is important to consider the following: 1) All three routers should initiate the
sampling process at the same time, 2) Gather same forwarding proof information,
and 3) Send/Update the controller C with the required information for verification.
An explicit signaling for each of these process can be sent from the controller to
the three routers, however, an efficient mechanism (less communication overhead) is
to avoid sending any signaling. To gather the forwarding proof information, we can
define set of hash functions based on packet identifiers (e.g., packet headers) to ensure
that all three routers provide the identical (correct) forwarding proof information.
Controller-based Verification: When the controller receives set of forwarding
proofs from the three entities (P , Q, and R) the system initiates the verification
process to identify forwarding misbehaviors. Each proof contains sampled tuples and
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sample count that were considered during the sampling process. The verification
mechanism can perform a comparison on the sample aggregates and count value
which can then determine if the router’s current state is compromised or not. The
performance of the verification process can be improved by comparing the samples
using tuple aggregates rather than checking each tuple in the sample aggregate, as
shown in [64].
5.3 Conclusion
Considering the network virtualization architecture, it is hard to pin-point the
compromised section of the network, since the virtual network may be operated at
different layers and be hosted on multiple third-party infrastructure components along
the end-to-end path. Therefore, to support accountability when hosting virtual
networks on third-party infrastructures, we require a misbehavior detection system
that dynamically monitors the forwarding performance and identify compromised
(malicious) network infrastructure components. An initial design of such a system
was discussed here. It is important to consider dynamic monitoring of network entities
irrespective of the trust management and service level agreements between them. This
helps in identifying possible security violations that can be encountered in the system.
The technical challenges and practical deployment of the above solution can be looked
into as a potential research topic in the network virtualization architecture.
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